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C HAP T E R 16 
Environmental Law 
JOHN J. O'BRIEN* AND JAMES A. THOMPSON, JR.** 
§16.1. Introduction. During the 1976 Survey year there were a 
number of developments, state and federal, administrative and judi-
cial, none of which, however, radically altered the environmental pro-
grams of Massachusetts. The Energy Facilities Siting Council adopted 
regulations regarding long-range planning and appellate review au-
thority. In the area of water pollution control the past year marked a 
shift in emphasis from permit issuance to permit enforcement. In ad-
dition, the federal Environmental Protection Agency adopted several 
regulations which will have an impact on the Massachusetts safe drink-
ing water program. Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court clarified its 
approach to cases involving the Massachusetts Environmental Policy 
Act.! 
A. ENERGY FACILITIES SITING 
§16.2. Energy Facilities Siting Council. During the 1976 Survey 
year the Energy Facilities Siting Council (the "Council") adopted and 
amended regulations! to facilitate the implementation of the long-
* John J. O'Brien is Associate Counsel to me Division of Water Pollution Control of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
** James A. Thompson, Jr. is Assistant Regional Counsel, Region I, United States 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
This article was written by the authors in their private capacities. No official support 
or endorsement by me Environmental Protection Agency, me Division of Water Pollu-
tion Control, or any other agency of me state or federal government is intended or 
should be inferred. 
§16.l IG.L. c. 30, §§61, 62. 
§16.2 IG.L. c. 164, § 69H(2), authorizes the Council to adopt regulations. The orig-
inal 1973 Council enactment required me adoption of such regulations by September 
1975. Acts of 1973, c. 1232, § 3. In 1975 this requirement was modified to require the 
adoption of regulations by December 31, 1975. Acts of 1975, c. 617, § 13. 
On October 27, 1975, the Council filed emergency regulations to govern me conduct 
of its business and the adoption of regulations. On December I, 1975, the Council filed 
"Regulations of the Energy Facilities Siting Council," which supplanted the earlier 
emergency regulations and which were comprised of seven chapters dealing with each 
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range planning and appellate review authority conferred upon it by 
the terms of its enabling legislation. 2 To appreciate the import of 
these regulations, it is useful to review them within the context of the 
Council's mandate. 
In 1973, on the basis of a report3 of a special legislative commis-
sion,4 the Legislature added sections 69G through 69R to chapter 164 
of the General Laws.s These sections, as amended,6 created the Coun-
cil,1 comprised of four members of the Governor's CabinetS and five9 
gubernatorial appointees representative of designated interest areas. 10 
of the following topics: general information and the conduct of business (Ch. A); rules 
of procedure (Ch. B); rules for the adoption of regulations (Ch. C); freedom of in-
formation and trade secret protection (Ch. D); environmental impact review (Ch. E); 
certificates of environmental impact and public need (Ch. F); and long-range forecasts 
and supplements (Ch. G). Subsequently, the Council has amended its regulations. On 
December 3, 1975 the Council filed "Regulations of the Emergency Facilities Siting 
Council-Amendment I" which made a change in the informational requirements for 
the supply component of electric company forecasts (Ch. G, Rule 64.8). On January 29, 
1976, the Council filed "Regulations of the Emergency Facilities Siting Council-
Amendment 2" which added an eighth chapter, Ch. H, governing notices of intention 
to construct oil facilities. On April 13, 1976, the Siting Council filed "Regulations of the 
Emergency Facilities Siting Council-Amendment 3" which made technical amend-
ments to Chapters F and G. On December 10, 1976, the Council filed "Regulations of 
the Emergency Facilities Siting Council-Amendment 4" which was a temporary regula-
tion effective until March 10, 1977, and which amended Ch. G Rule 64.1(3). 
2 G.L. c. 164 §§ 69G-Ras amended through Acts of 1975, c. 617. 
3 THIRD REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC POWER PLANT SITING COMMISSION. 
H. Doc, No. 6190 (1973). 
4 Resolves of 1971, c. 78, established a Special Commission to study a number of mat-
ters pertaining to energy facilities and the manner in which such facilities relate to a 
suitable energy supply, to the environment, and to regulatory procedures of state and 
local government. The Legislature has demonstrated a continuing interest in the subject 
area of this commission's study. The commission has been "revived and continued," and 
expanded in scope of study, variously, by a number of enactments: Resolves of 1972, c. 
1& c. 74; Resolves of 1973, c. 54, c. 68, c. 1l0, & c. 137; Resolves of 1974, c. 26, c. 56. 
• Acts of 1973, c. 1232, § l. 
6 The 1973 enactment limited the Council's jurisdiction to "electric energy facilities." 
Acts of 1973, c. 1232. By subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1975, the Council's 
jurisdiction was broadened to also include "gas facilities" and "oil facilities," respectively. 
Acts of 1974, c. 852; Acts of 1975, c. 617. 
7 G.L. c. 164, § 69H. 
8 The statute directs that the following cabinet members, or their designees, shall be 
on the Council; the secretaries of administration and finance, consumer affairs, en-
vironmental affairs, and manpower affairs. [d., as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 617, § 2. 
The former version of G.L. c. 164, § 69H, provided for a Council comprised dif-
ferently. See G.L. c. 164, § 69H, as orginally added by Acts of 1973, c. 1232, § l. 
9 As this chapter was going to press the Legislature further amended the composition 
of the Council by increasing the number of gubernatorial appointees to six and specify-
ing that the sixth member shall be "a representative of organized labor." Acts of 1977, 
c. 167, amending G.L. c. 164, § 69H. 
10 G.L. c. 164, § 69H, specifies that one appointee be a professional engineer, one 
appointee "be experienced'in the conservation and protection of the environment," and 
three members each "be experienced in matters relating to" one of the three energy in-
dustries subject to the Council's jurisdiction. See note 6 supra. 
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The statute requires that three of these appointees have expertise in 
matters pertaining to one of the three energy industry sectors reg-
ulated by the Council-electricity, gas, and oipl-and, further re-
stricts the issues upon which these industry experts may vote. 12 The 
Council is "responsible for implementing the energy policies contained 
in sections 69H through 69R of chapter 164 of the General Laws to 
provide a necessary energy supply to the commonwealth with a 
minimum impact on the environment at the lowest possible COSt."13 
This mandate is to be fulfilled by two means: (I) the requirement that 
all energy companies prepare, and submit to the Council for approval, 
documentation of their long-range plans; 14 and (2) the grant of au-
thority to the Council to override certain actions by state and local 
governmental units which might interfere with the construction or 
operation of an approved energy facility.ls These two functions of the 
Council will each be set forth, followed by an evaluation and discus-
sion of the interrelationship of the two regulatory programs. 
The Council's long-range planning authority is exercised, in the 
case of electric companies16 and gas companies,17 by the review and 
11 See note 6 supra. 
12 Presumably to preclude problems associated with competition among the three en-
ergy industries, the three industry experts may only vote on Council matters "directly 
related to" their respective industry. G.L. c. 164, § 69H. 
13 [d. The Council's interpretation of this mandate will, of course, be shaped by other 
mandates such as those found in the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, G.L. c. 
30, § 61, and the "environmental bill of rights" provision in the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion, MASS. CONST. amend. art. 97. For a discussion of the Massachusetts Environmental 
Policy Act, see Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 21.2, at 578; §§ 
21.8-21.13 at 605-12. 
14 G.L. c. 164, §§ 691, 69K. 
IS [d. § 69K. 
16 The term "electric company" is defined in id., § 69G, as follows: 
a corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth empowered to gen-
erate, transmit, distribute or sell electricity for ultimate use by fifty or more per-
sons; ... a foreign corporation empowered under the laws of its state of in-
corporation to generate, transmit, distribute or sell electricity for ultimate use by 
fifty or more persons and qualified to do business in the commonwealth; ... a 
municipal corporation empowered to operate a municipal lighting plant under the 
provision of section thirty-five or section thirty-six [of chapter 164 of the General 
Laws}. 
Also included in the § 69G definition of the term is the definition given "electric com-
pany" by G.L. c. 164, § 1: 
a corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth for the purpose of 
making by means of water power, steam power or otherwise and selling, or dis-
tributing and selling, electricity within the commonwealth, or authorized by spe-
cial act so to do, even though subsequently authorized to make or sell gas. 
The § 69G definition of "electric company" is also found in the Siting Council Re-
gulations, Ch. A, Rule 3.3. 
17 The term "gas company" is defined in G.L. c. 164, § 69G, as follows: 
a corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth empowered to man-
ufacture or store gas for resale or distribution to a gas company as defined in sec-
tion one; ... a foreign corporation empowered under the laws of its state of in-
3
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approval of long-range "forecasts" and "forecast supplements,"18 and, 
in the case of facilities planned by oil companies,19 by the review and 
approval of "notices of intention to construct."20 
Each electric and gas company is required to submit to the Council 
for its review and approval "a long-range forecast with respect to the 
[electric power or gas] needs and requirements of its market area, tak-
ing into account wholesale bulk [power or gas] sales or purchases or 
other cooperative arrangements with other [electric or gas] com-
panies .... "21 All electric and gas companies were required to submit 
an initial forecast by May 1, 1976, a second forecast by the end of 
1980, and subsequent forecasts every fifth year thereafter.22 In each 
intervening year, the long-range forecast must be revised and up-
dated by the submission of a supplement thereto.23 In their forecasts, 
electric and gas companies must provide detailed descriptions of their 
collaboration with other companies in planning, providing or forecast-
ing for energy;24 their forecast of the energy needs of their market 
corporation to manufacture or store gas for resale or distribution to a gas company 
as defined in section one, and qualified to do business in the commonwealth; ... a 
natural gas pipeline company as defined in section [seventyl-five B [of chapter 164 
of the General Lawsl; ... a municipal corporation empowered to operate a munic-
ipal gas plant under the provisions of section thirty-five or section thirty-six [of 
chapter 164 of the General Lawsl. 
Also included in the § 69G definition of the term is the definition given "gas company" 
by G.L. c. 164, § 1: "[Al corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth 
for the purpose of making and selling, or distributing and selling, gas within the com-
monwealth, even though subsequently authorized to make or sell electricity." 
The § 69G definition of "gas company" is also found in the Siting Council Regulations, 
Ch. A, Rule 3.3. 
18 G.L. c. 164, §§ 691, 69K. 
19 The term "oil company" is defined in G.L. c. 164, § 69G, as follows: 
(1) any person, authority or corporation organized under the laws of the com-
monwealth empowered or intending to construct or operate an oil facility; (2) a 
foreign corporation or person empowered under the laws of its state of incorpora-
tion to, or intending to construct or operate an oil facility, and qualified to do bus-
iness in the Commonwealth. 
The above definition is also found in the Siting Council Regulations, Ch. A, Rule 3.3. 
20 G.L. c. 164, §§ 691, 69K. 
21 [d. § 691. Electric company forecasts must cover the ensuing ten-year period; gas 
company forecasts must cover the ensuing five-year period. /d. Siting Council Reg-
ulations, Ch. G, Rule 61.1. 
The Siting Council Regulations also require that the forecasts include, "for purposes 
of establishing historical baseline data," such information as can be obtained regarding 
the year of submission as well as years prior thereto. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, 
Rules 63.4, 66.4. 
22 G.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 62.3(1). 
23 G.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 62.3(2). See the Siting 
Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rules 65.1-65.3 (electric companies) and Rules 68.1-68.2 
(gas companies) for a discussion of the purpose and contents of the supplements. 
24 G.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 63.2 (electric companies) 
and Rule 66.2 (gas companies). 
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area;25 their resources;26 and the actions that they propose to take, in-
cluding the construction of facilities, "which will affect [their] capacity 
to meet [the] needs" of their market area.27 
Before certain oil facilities may be constructed in the Common-
wealth, the Council must have received and approved a "notice of in-
tention to construct" the facility.28 Notices seeking approval of a facil-
ity designed so that a significant portion of its output could be 
gasoline or a similarly light oil product (termed a "complex re-
finery")29 must be filed with the Council "not later than two years 
prior to the commencement of construction" thereof.3o Notices seek-
ing approval of other oil facilities31 must be filed with the Council "not 
later than one year prior to commencement of construction" 
thereof. 32 These notices must contain detailed descriptions of the 
proposed facility and its site,33 the applicant,34 the area in which the 
facility's products are to be marketed,35 and the means by which the 
facility is to be financed. 36 The notice must also contain analyses of 
the environmental impact of the proposed facility37 and the need for 
the facility. 38 
25 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. C, Rules 63.3-63.7 (electric com-
panies) and Rules 66.3-66.7 (gas companies). 
26 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. C, Rule 64.2 (electric companies) and Rule 67.2 
(gas companies). 
27 C.L. C. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. C, Rules 64.4-64.9 (electric 
companies) and Rules 67.4-67.8 (gas companies). Forecast supplements must indicate 
significant changes occurring after the most recent long-range forecast as previously 
supplemented. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. C, Rule 65.2 (electric companies) and 
Rule 68.2 (gas companies). The Council's regulations provide a special procedure, 
termed "occasional ,supplements," applicable only to electric companies, to permit ex-
peditious inclusion of certain small-scale facilities in an electric company's long-range 
planning. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. C, Rule 65.3. 
28 C.L. c. 164, §§ 691, J. 
29 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 71.3. 
30 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 72.3(2). 
31 Oil facilities are defined in C.L. c. 164, § 69C, as follows: 
any new unit, including associated building and structures, designed for, or capa-
ble of, the refining, storage of more than five hundred thousand barrels or trans-
shipment of oil or refined oil products and any new pipeline for the transportation 
of oil or refined oil products which is greater than one mile in length except re-
structuring, rebuilding, or relaying of existing pipelines of the same capacity; pro-
vided, however, that this oil facility shall not include any facility covered by a 
long-range forecast or supplement thereto under section sixty-nine 1 [of chapter 
164 of the General Lawsl. 
The above definition is also found in the Siting Council Regulations, Ch. A, Rule 3.3. 
32 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 72.3(1). 
33 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 73.2. 
34 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 73.3. 
35 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 73.4. 
38 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 73.7. By contrast, finan-
cial data is not required of electric or gas facilities, doubtless because those two in-
dustries, as distinct from the oil industry, are regulated utilities. See C.L. c. 164, § 691. 
37 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 73.6. 
38 C.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 73.5. 
5
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Once it has received a forecast, a forecast supplement or a notice of 
intention to construct an oil facility, the Council must take certain ac-
tions within specified periods.39 Within six months of receipt, the 
Council must hold a public hearing on the application.40 These hear-
ings are to be conducted as adjudicatory proceedings41 within the def-
inition of the Administrative Procedure Act.42 However, prior to the 
commencement of an adjudicatory hearing on a forecast or forecast 
supplement which first proposes a facility,43 a public hearing (termed 
an "informational hearing")44 must be held in the locality45 in which 
that facility is to be sited. Because notices of intention to construct oil 
facilities are by their nature proposals to construct specific facilities in 
specific sites, informational hearings must be conducted on every such 
filing. 46 Within twenty-four months of receipt, the Council must take 
action approving or rejecting41 notices of intention to construct com-
plex oil refineries.48 The Council must take similar action with respect 
to notices of intention to construct other oil facilities,49 and with re-
spect to oil and gas company forecasts,5o within twelve months of the 
receipt thereof.51 The statute prescribes standards for the Council's 
action on forecasts52 and notices of intention to construct.53 Upon re-
3" The statute prescribes no penalties for the failure of the Siting Council to act 
within these time periods. 
40 G.L. c. 164, § 69]. Siting Council Regulations, Ch.G, Rule 62.6 (electric and gas 
companies) and Ch. H, Rule 72.6 (oil companies). 
41 G.L. c. 164, § 69]. The rules of procedure governing such adjudicatory hearings 
are found in Siting Council Regulations, Ch. B. 
42 G.L. c. 30A. 
43 See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
44 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 62.7 (electric and gas companies). See G.L. 
c.164, § 69]. 
45 No definition of the term "locality" is provided either in the Siting Council's en-
abling legislation or in its regulations. Cj. note 95 infra. 
46 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 72.7 (oil companies). 
47 G.L. c. 164, § 69]. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 72.9(1). See notes 54 & 
55 and accompanying text infra. 
48 See note 29 and accompanying text supra. 
4" G.L. c. 164, § 69]. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. H, Rule 72.9(1). 
50 No deadline is prescribed for action on forecast supplements. 
51 G.L. c. 164, § 69]. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 62.9 (1). 
52 No standards are provided for Council action on forecast supplements. The stan-
dards by which the Council intends to act upon supplements are set forth in Rule 62.9 
(2) of Chapter G of the Siting Council Regulations. 
53 G.L. c. 164, § 69J. The standards are not stated with the utmost precision, but ap-
pear to impose differing requirements for approvals of forecasts, on one hand, and oil 
facilities, on the other hand. 
For example, to approve a forecast the Council must find, inter alia, that the electric 
or gas company's projections are based on "substantially accurate historical information 
and reasonable statistical projection methods" and are "consistent with" forecasts of 
other companies subject to the Council's jurisdiction. Also, before it may approve fore-
casts that indicate planned expansion and construction of new facilities, the Council 
must determine that the facilities are consistent with the Commonwealth's health, en-
vironmental, resource use, and development policies, and are consistent with the Coun-
6
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view of the record of the proceeding, the Council will approve, ap-
prove subject to stated conditions reject, or approve in part and reject 
in part, a forecast, forecast supplement or notice of intention to con-
struct. 54 The Council will also consider issuing an approval while re-
taining jurisdiction for further review of a specific issue or detail, or 
issuing an approval subject to subsequent approval of a particular 
facility by another state or local agency.55 
The statute does not expressly provide for penalties or equitable 
remedies for the failure of an energy company to make a timely filing 
of a long-range plan or for the failure of an energy company to make 
such a filing that is approvable by the Council. However, adherence to 
the long-range plan approval requirements is to be secured, indirectly, 
through the operation of a dual-faceted prohibition. First, the statute 
prohibits construction56 of any energy facility unless the facility, if an 
electric or gas facility, "is consistent with" the applicant company's 
most recently approved forecast or supplement thereto, or, if an oil 
facility, has been the subject of an approved notice of intention to 
construct. 57 Second, the statute prohibits state agencies58 from issuing 
construction permits59 for an energy facility unless the facility and the 
site therefor "conform" to the company's most recently approved 
forecast or supplement, or if the facility has been the subject of an 
approved notice of intention to construct.60 To allay confusion regard-
ing the phasing and import of the notice of intention to construct an 
oil facility, the statute expressly states that approval of such a notice is 
cil's basic mandate-to provide a necessary power supply with a minimum impact on 
the environment at the lowest possible cost. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. 
To approve a notice of intention to construct an oil facility the Council must de-
termine that all information regarding the facility'S proposed source of supply and 
financing, and its economic viability, are substantially accurate and adequate. The 
Council must also determine that the facility plans are consistent with the Common-
wealth's health, environmental, resource use, and development policies. However, the 
statute does not appear to require that the Council determine that the facility is consis-
tent with the Council's basic mandate. 
No standards are provided for Council action on forecast supplements. The stan-
dards by which the Council intends to act upon supplements are set forth in Rule 
62.9(2) of Chapter G of the Siting Council Regulations. 
54 Taken literally, the statute only authorizes the Council to act with such latitude in 
its review of forecasts. G.L. c. 164, § 69]. Nonetheless, in its regulations the Council has 
indicated an intent to be similarly flexible in its approval of forecast supplements. Siting 
Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 62.9 (1) (electric and gas companies). With regard to 
oil companies the regulations authorize the Council to approve the initial petition to 
construct, approve it subject to conditions, or disapprove it. [d., Ch. H, Rule 72.9 (1). 
55 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, Rule 62.9 (1) (electric and gas companies) and 
Ch. H, Rule 72.9 (1) (oil companies). 
56 See note 62 and accompanying text infra. 
51 G.L. c. 164, § 691. However, this prohibition is not necessarily conclusive. See text 
at note 107 infra. 
58 The prohibition does not also extend to municipalities. 
5. The term is not defined in the statute. 
60 G.L. c. 164, § 691. 
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"not to be considered approval of construction permits by state 
agencies."61 Additionally, to eliminate transitional problems which 
would be engendered were the statute to be applied retroactively, 
provision is made to exempt facilities "under construction" on May 1, 
1976, the deadline for the submission of initial electric and gas com-
pany forecasts, from the requirement that their construction and op-
eration be authorized by inclusion in an approved forecast, forecast 
supplement, or notice of intention to construct.62 All actions taken by 
the Council with regard to forecasts, forecast supplements, and notices 
of intention to construct are exempt from the provisions of sections 
61 and 62 of chapter 31 of the General Laws, the Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act.63 
As an adjunct to its role in passing upon the long-range plans of 
energy companies, the Council is vested with extraordinary power to 
insure that the energy companies may construct, operate, and main-
tain the facilities contained in these plans without undue interference 
by any state or local agency. This second regulatory power is exer-
cised, with respect to facilities by all energy companies, by the review 
of applications for, and the issuance of, "certificates of environmental 
impact and public need."64 The Council issues these certificates upon 
an energy company's appeal from the action of a state or local 
agency.65 Once issued, a certificate will be the basis for further regula-
tion of the facility66 and will supersede the state or local action67 
which gave rise to the petition to the Council. 
The statute delineates six specific grounds upon which an energy 
company may petition the Council for a certificate.68 Because of curi-
ous interpretive questions that may arise from an examination of the 
statute, it is useful to set forth the grounds stated in the statute: 
[T]he ... company is prevented from building a facility [1] because it 
cannot meet standards imposed by a state or local agency with 
commercially available equipment or [2] because the processing or 
granting by a state or local agency of any approval, consent, per-
mit or certificate has been unduly delayed; or [3] the ... company 
believes there are inconsistencies among resource use permits is-
6 1 Id. 
62 The initial Council enactment provided for an exemption for facilities under con-
struction prior to December 31, 1975. Acts of 1973, c. 1232, § 4. The 1975 amend-
menlS replaced this date with the May 1, 1976 date. Acts of 1975, c. 617, § 15. The Sit-
ing Council Regulations reflect the more recent date. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. G, 
Rule 61.6 (electric and gas companies) and Ch. H, Rule 71.6 (oil companies). 
63 G.L. c. 164, § 691. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. E, Rule 41.3 (3). Cf text at note 
108 infra. 
64 G.L. C. 164, §§ 69K-O. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rules 51.1-56.2. 
65Id. 
66 G.L. c. 164, § 69K. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 55.3. 
67 Id. 
68 G.L. c. 164, § 69K. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.2. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/20
§16.2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 551 
sued by such state or local agencies; or [4] the ... company be-
lieves that a nonregulatory issue or condition has been raised or 
imposed by such state or local agencies such as but not limited to 
aesthetics and recreation; or [5] the facility cannot be constructed 
due to any disapprovals, conditions or denials by local govern-
ments, except with respect to any lands or interests therein, ex-
cluding public ways, owned or managed by any state agency or 
local government. 69 
An additional ground is specified elsewhere in the statute, namely, 
that "[6] any state or local agency has imposed a burdensome condi-
tion or limitation on any license or permit which has a substantial im-
pact on the council's responsibilities as set forth in [section 69H of 
chapter 164 of the General Laws]."70 
The phrasing of and punctuation in these six grounds poses a 
number of questions. First, the fifth ground is applicable only to local 
actions and seems intended to provide energy companies with access 
to the Council's appeal authority in instances in which their projects 
are impeded by local actions based on narrow parochial consid-
erations. Second, a question arises from the form of the fourth 
ground-appeals based on "nonregulatory" issues or conditions such 
as aesthetics or recreation. The wording of the statute would appear 
to authorize the Council to override agency decisions intended to im-
plement standards predicated in part on aesthetic or recreational 
goals. 71 However, the question whether such decisions could be over-
ridden is obviated in large measure by the Council itself: in its reg-
ulations the Council has attempted to define "nonregulatory issue" as 
a matter "not within the statutory jurisdiction of the agency in ques-
tion."72 Thus, decisions based on aesthetic considerations would not be 
overridden if the agency's authority extended to such considerations. 
Third, three of the grounds-the first, second, and fifth-appear to 
be grounds for the challenge of actions interfering with facilities yet to 
be built or constructed. If these grounds are so interpreted and are 
not construed to apply to the construction of pollution control 
69 G.L. c. 164, § 69K. Accord, Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.2 (numbering 
and emphasis added). 
70 G.L. c. 164, § 69K. Accord, Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.2 (number 
added). 
71 The identification of "aesthetic" and "recreational" components of agency decisions 
will not always be a simple task. For example, the several water quality classification 
groups established by the Massachusetts water quality standards are predicated upon 
recreational and aesthetic, as well as agricultural and -industrial, use objectives. See, e.g., 
Massachusetts Division of Water Pollution Control, Rules and Regulations for the 
Establishment of Minimum Water Quality Standards and for the Protection of the Qual-
ity and Value of Water Resources, Regulation II, Classes B and SA (filed, May 2, 1974) 
[hereinafter "the 1974 Water Quality Standards"]. For a discussion of the history be-
hind the 1974 Water Quality Standards, see note 73 infra. 
72 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.2(4). 
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technology added to an existing energy installation, they would elimi-
nate the first ground as a basis for contesting a state agency require-
ment that additional technology be installed to attain progressively 
more stringent air or water pollution control standards.73 Moreover, 
the first ground presents a further problem of interpretation. An en-
ergy company might find that, because the proposed facility site was 
on a stream segment that is subject to an antidegredation prohibi-
tion74 or subject to stringent effluent limitation because of proximity 
to a vital wildlife habitat, there is no pollution abatement equipment 
"commercially available" to attain the required effluent limitation. 
Of all the grounds for an energy company appeal, the sixth appears 
to be the most sweeping in its potential application. It is arguable that 
any expensive or elaborate condition or limitation could be claimed to 
be "burdensome" and of "substantial impact" to the Council's basic re-
sponsibility.75 In its regulations the Council has attempted to interpret 
this ground and has said that it "may consider a condition or limita-
tion to be burdensome if the resulting cost would be out of propor-
tion to the cost of the facility or to the benefits to be gained from the 
condition or limitation."76 The Council has similarly attempted to de-
fine the standard for evaluating claims based on the second ground. 
Claims of "undue delay" in the processing of a given agency permit 
will be evaluated in terms of the processing time which would be 
standard for all permit applications of similar complexity and con-
73 The first water. quality standards for the Commonwealth were adopted in 1967, 
Massachusetts Division of Water Pollution Control, Water Quality Standards (filed 
March 6, 1967), in response to a provision in the Water Quality Act of 1965, which 
provision encouraged states to set their own water quality standards for interstate wa-
ters or portions thereof within their borders, when such standards were consistent with 
the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(b)(c) (Supp. V. 1965-1969). 
In 1972 Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974), which completely supplanted prior fed-
eral water pollution control law. This Act requires that states revise their water quality 
standards at least once every three years. Id., § 13I3(c). In 1974, in response to this re-
quirement, the Commonwealth's water quality standards were revised and the 1974 
Water Quality Standards, supra note 71, were filed. These 1974 revisions chaQged cer-
tain discharge parameters and generally upgraded the classification groups applicable to 
the various stream segments of the waters of the Commonwealth. Consistent with the 
requirements of the amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the 
Commonwealth will be reviewing and revising its standards from time to time. It is 
possible that as various parameters in the standards are made more stringent additional 
control technology may be required of facilities now operational. 
74 The Massachusetts water quality standards generally prohibit new discharges into 
inland waters "upstream of the most upstream discharge of wastewater from a munici-
pal waste treatment facility or municipal sewer," and into certain high quality coastal 
waters. The 1974 Water Quality Standards, supra note 71, Regulation III, Rules l.A 
and l.B, respectively. The antidegradation provision, however, does provide a proce-
dure whereby cooling water discharges from certain energy facilities could be permitted 
into waters otherwise subject to the antidegradation provision. /d. 
7S But see note 13 supra. 
7. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.2 (5). 
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troversy.77 In deference to the agencies from whom appeals would be 
taken on the issue of "undue delay," the Council regulations require 
that the energy company seeking Council review on that ground pro-
vide the agency with advance notice. 78 On balance, however, it seems 
clear that the grounds provided for energy company appeals will pro-
vide ample ammunition for m.yor challenges to state and local reg-
ulatory action. 
The Council has prescribed a two-stage procedure for considering 
requests for certificates. An energy company must first present an in-
itial petition stating the grounds of its claim,79 and, if the Council 
finds that sufficient grounds exist, the company must then file an ap-
plication for a certificate of environmental impact and public need.80 
More than one ground may be asserted in the initial petition81 and 
application.82 The entire process, from filing of petition to ultimate 
decision, is to take no more than seven and one-half months.83 
To obtain Council review of a decision of a state or local agency, an 
energy company, after appropriate notice,84 must submit an initial pe-
tition stating the ground(s) for its claim for a certificate.85 Within 
seven days of the receipt of this petition, the Council must elect either 
to schedule a formal hearing on the petition or to accept the applica-
tion for a certificate deferring a decision on the merits of the initial 
petition.86 If action on an initial petition is thus deferred, or if, after 
hearing, the initial petition is granted, the energy company may pro-
ceed to file an application for a certificate.87 If, after hearing, the 
Councjl determines that adequate grounds do not exist for the sub-
mission of an application, the initial petition is denied and the peti-
tioning energy company may proceed to seek judicial review of that 
determination.88 If permitted to file an application, the energy com-
pany must adhere to specific requirements of notice89 form and con-
tent.90 Among other things, the energy company must provide notice 
71/d., Rule 52.2 (2). 
781d. 
7. /d., Rules 52.1-52.4. 
80/d., Rules 53.2-53.7. 
81 C.L. C. 164, §§ 69K, 69L. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rules 52.1, 53.3 (xiii). 
82 C.L. c. 164, §§ 69K, 69L. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 53.7. 
83 C.L. C. 164, § 690. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 55.1 (a decision on an 
application for a certificate 'shall be made within 6 months of filing). Siting Council 
Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.4 (a decision to accept an application shall be made within 6 
weeks of the petition). . 
84 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.3. 
85Id., Rule 52.1. 
86Id., Rule 52.4. 
81Id., Rule 53.1. 
88 C.L. c. 164, § 69P. See Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 52.4. 
89 C.L. c. 164, § 69L(B). Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 53.2. A deficient 
notice may be cured by a motion to the Council. C.L. c. 164, § 69L(C); Siting Council 
Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 53.2. 
90 C.L. c. 164, § 69L(A). Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 53.3. 
11
O'Brien and Thompson: Chapter 16: Environmental Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
554 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.2 
to each agency whose decision is being contested.9l Applications for 
certificates may be amended at any time prior to the conclusion of the 
proceeding, subject to additional notice requirements.92 Proceedings 
on applications for certificates, like forecast proceedings,93 are ad-
judicatory proceedings.94 Also, nonadjudicatory "informational" hear-
ings may be conducted in the vicinity95 of a facility for which a certifi-
cate proceeding has been commenced.96 
On the basis of the record assembled in the adjudicatory proceed-
ing, the Council may issue certificates of environmental impact and 
public need which will supplant the state or local agency actions that 
were the subject of the energy company's petition.97 Such certificates, 
moreover, become the basis for all further regulatory action by the af-
fected state or local agency with respect to the subject facility, as if the 
certificate "had been directly granted by the ... agency."98 Certificates 
issued by the Council may be transferred to other energy companies 
by the holder.99 The Council regulations also provide that, should a 
majority of its members be unable to agree upon the disposition of an 
application for a certificate, it is to be deemed denied and may be 
treated by the applicant therefor, at its option, either as a denial with-
out prejudice or as a final agency action ripe for judicial review. loo 
The Council may, upon the request of an appropriate party, un-
dertake proceedings regarding the amendment of a certificate it has 
already issued. lol 
In deference to the influence exerted by the federal government in 
many major environmental control programs, the statute puts two 
constraints upon the Council. First, the Council is not empowered to 
issue a certificate, the effect of which would be to grant or modify a 
permit in a way that "if so granted or modified by the appropriate 
state or local agency, would be invalid because of a conflict with 
applicable federal water or air standards or requirements."102 Second, 
the statute details, in language mirroring federal water pollution con-
trol regulations,103 a number of procedures that must be followed by 
the Council, should the Division of Water Pollution Control be "del-
91 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 53.2. 
D. C.L. c. 164, § 69L. (D); Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 53.6. 
9a See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra. 
9' C.L. c. 164, § 69M. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 54.1. 
9. The term "vicinity" is not defined either in the statute or the Siting Council Reg-
ulation. Cf note 45 supra. 
98 Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 54.2 . 
• 7 C.L. c. 164, § 69K. 
B81d. 
··ld. 
10" Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 55.2. See note 116 irifra. 
101 C.L. c. 164, § 69L(E). Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 55.4. 
102 C.L. C. 164, § 69K. 
103 Compare 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.32, 125.33 with C.L. c. 164, § 69M. 
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egated" responsibility to assume the federal water pollution control 
permit program,104 and should the Council consider issuing a certifi-
cate to override a determination of the Director of that Division re-
garding a discharge to surface waters of the Commonwealth. lo5 
As noted above, the statute intends that the linkage between the two 
regulatory programs of the Council be effected through a provision 
limiting the availability of the certificate procedures, in most instances, 
to facilities that were included in a previously approved long-range 
plan or supplement thereto. loB However, this requirement is not 
ironclad. The provision can be waived by the Council "for emergency 
or unforeseen conditions which jeopardize the health and safety of 
the public."lo7 Several other features of the two regulatory programs 
should be noted. First, whereas the long-range planning activities are 
exempt. from the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act,108 no such 
exemption exists for the certificate process. Presumably, the Council 
will find the environmental data generated as part of the adjudicatory 
proceeding useful in satisfying the environmental impact review obli-
gations that it faces in the exercise of its certificate powers. 109 Second, 
both of the Council's functions have been declared adjudicatory pro-
ceedings by the LegislatureYo In many cases, energy companies 
already have a right to formal review from state agency de-
terminations with which they are dissatisfiedYl Thus, in these in-
stances, the Council is the second source of administrative review 
available to the energy company since the Council can, by issuing a 
certificate of environmental impact and public need, supersede state or 
local action. 112 Indeed, the Council, as a matter of policy, may decline 
to consider an application for a certificate if the company had not 
fully exhausted the administrative remedies which would initially 
104 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 set up a nation-
wide system for the regulation of water pollution, the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). 33 U.S.c. § 1342 (Supp. IV 1974). The federal statute 
comprehends that the system will be established by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and may be administered either by the EPA or by qualifying 
states, upon delegation by the EPA. [d. § 1342(b)(c). At the present time Massachusetts 
has parallel regulatory authority in the Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, G.L. c. 21, §§ 
26-53, inclusive but has elected not to seek to assume NPDES program responsibility. 
Instead, the EPA and the Massachusetts Division of Water Pollution Control, each 
under their respective enabling legislation, issue 'Joint" permits. See O'Brien & Deland, 
Environmental Law, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 6.2-6.7, at 144-78. 
1115 G.L. c. 164, §§ 69K, 69M. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. F, Rule 55.6. 
1116 See note 57 and accompanying text supra. 
1117 G.L. c. 164, § 69L(A)(3). 
1118 See note 63 and accompanying text supra. 
11If) See G.L. c. 164, § 69L(A)(2). 
1111 See text at notes 40-42, 93-94 supra. 
III See G.L. c. 30A, § 14. The State Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial 
review of final decisions of state agencies, but local government action is exempt. See id., 
§ 1(2). 
112 See text at notes 65-70 supra. 
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spring from the decision of the state or local agency.u 3 If the Council 
does not follow such a policy, an energy company dissatisfied with the 
treatment of its facility in the initial permit processing might elect to 
forego administrative and judicial review at that level and, instead, pe-
tition the C.ouncil directly.u 4 Another interesting situation is pre-
sented by the fact that, as a result of the Legislature's characterization 
of all Council proceedings as adjudicatory, the Legislature has trans-
formed into adjudicatory proceedings certain proceedings not charac-
terized as such by the state or local agency which originally adminis-
ters the contested permit or approval procedure.us In any event, all 
decisions of the Council are subject to judicial review, 116 which can be 
requested by certain specified "parties in interest."117 
One of the most notable features of the statute is the very nature of 
the Council. Although other high level policy councils, from time to 
time, have been created administratively118 by the governor from his 
113 The Siting Council Regulations do not express any policy in this regard. 
114 Energy companies face a dilemma in choosing a strategy to seek modification or re-
versal of an adverse state agency determination. Ordinarily, an energy company would 
be required to exhaust its administrative remedies (e.g., request and participate in an 
adjudicatory hearing) before the agency prior to securing judicial review of the agency's 
action. See Galiagher v. Metropolitan District Comm'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 32, 41, 359 
N.E.2d 36,41, (dictum); J. & J. Enterprises, Inc. v. Martignetti, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 172, 
177-81,341 N.E.2d 645, 648. See also Curtin Jr. & Young, Civil Practice and Procedure, 
1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 13.3, at 334-39. However, the potential for review by the 
Council would seem to require in most instances that an energy company exhaust all 
rights to administrative review both before the agency and before the Council before 
judicial review would be appropriate. 
115 Because of peculiarities of statutory provisions, agency practice, and interpretive 
decisions, rights to adjudicatory review do not necessarily attach to all determinations of 
state and local agencies. See, e.g., Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. 
Uti!., 363 Mass. 474, 486-88, 295 N.E.2d 876, 884-85 (1973); Reid v. Acting Comm'r of 
the Dep't of Community Affairs, 362 Mass. 136, 140, 142-43, 284 N.E.2d 245, 247, 249 
(1972). 
116 G.L. c. 164, § 69P. Siting Council Regulations, Ch. B., Rule 17.2. The statute pro-
vides for judicial review in accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 25, § 5, and thus 
vests the Supreme Judicial Court with original jurisdiction in such actions. See Save the 
Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139, 139 & n.2, 322 N.E.2d 
742, 746 & n.2; Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 363 Mass. 474, 
502-04, 295 N.E.2d 876, 892-93 (1973). The statute also specifies the bases upon which 
such actions may be urged. G.L. c. 164, § 69P. 
117 The Siting Council Regulations discuss how a person may intervene as a party. See 
Siting Council Regulations, Ch. A Rule 3.3, Ch. B, Rules 15.2 & 15.3. See also Save the 
Bay, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139. 144-151, 322 N.E.2d 
742, 748-50, where the Supreme Judicial Court discusses what constitutes a "party in in-
terest." 11. For example, on February 25, 1974, Francis W. Sargent, the then Governor of the 
Commonwealth, established a Resource Management Policy Council, comprised of the 
Secretaries of eight cabinet secretariats, to "make recommendations ... and ... develop 
policy concerning the development, conservation, and management of the land and 
other physical resources of the Commonwealth in order to best meet the social and 
economic needs of its citizens." Executive Order No. 103 (1974). The Resource Man-
agement Policy Council has not been continued during the term of Governor Sargent's 
immediate successor. 
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executive staff, this appears to be the first time such an entity has 
been created by statute and vested with direct authority to implement 
its policy objectives. By virtue of its composition of cabinet members 
and gubernatorial appointees, all members are direct appointees of 
the Governor and thus can be expected to reflect his predilections and 
priorities insofar as they relate to matters before the Council. Curi-
ously, however, there is no provision for a member representative of 
local government interests, notwithstanding the fact that the Council is 
empowered to override local determinations. The powers vested in 
the Council are also unusual in that this is the first time such a council 
has been empowered to exercise adjudicative responsibilities as part of 
its official duties,119 Presumably the ex officio cabinet members will 
suitably articulate and espouse the interests of the agencies constituent 
within their respective executive offices, yet maintain the degree of 
impartiality which is necessary and appropriate for the proper dis-
charge of their adjudicative responsibilities. 
Another salient feature of the Council's creation is the Council's 
role as an agency to which appeals of lower agency decisions, both on 
the state and local level, may be urged for review and, if necessary, 
overridden. While the arrangement is admittedly unusual, it is by no 
means unique. In at least two other contexts, the Legislature has seen 
fit to vest an entity with such appellate power. Under section lO of 
chapter 40A of the General Laws, the Department of Public Utilities is 
authorized to exempt certain gas facilities from restrictions imposed 
pursuant to a local zoning restriction. 120 A similar authority to over-
ride local jurisdiction is found in sections 20 through 23 of chapter 
40B of the General Laws, the so-called "Anti-Snob Zoning Act," which 
creates a process whereby certain qualified developers may seek and 
obtain review and override of actions of local officials and agencies 
having jurisdiction over different aspects of a proposed low income 
housing project. l2l The use of both these administrative appeal 
schemes has been endorsed by the Supreme Judicial Court. 122 Perhaps 
119 The executive office secretaries are not vested with responsibilities which entail ad-
judicative determinations. Of the executive office secretariats, the Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs does have a functional responsibility which somewhat approaches 
the type of responsibility conferred upon the Council. Under G.L. c. 30, § 62, tJ:Ie Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs reviews environmental impact reports of state agencies. 
This function has been characterized as a "regulatory" (as opposed to an "adjudicatory") 
activity. City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 364 Mass. 639, 662, 308 N.E.2d 
488,503,6 E.R.C. 1337, 1347,4 E.L.R. 20314, 20320 (1974). For a discussion of Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority, see O'Brien & Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW § 18.5, 449-53. 
120 See Pereira v. New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 112-13, 301 N.E.2d 441, 444 
(1973); Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 19.12, at 540-45. 
121 See Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dep't of 
Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 354, 294 N.E.2d 393, 406 (1973); Student Com-
ment, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 12.30, at 454-73. 
122 See notes 120 & 121 supra. 
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more unusual, but also with precedent, is the provi ion in the Coun-
cil's enabling legislation authorizing it to issue a "co prehensive per-
mit."123 The Anti-Snob Zoning Act contains a simila "comprehensive 
permit" provision, but the range of authorities veste in the Act's ap-
pellate entities is confined to local powers and thus s much narrower 
in scope than that given to the Council. 124 
By creating the Council, the Legislature has adde 
the list of states having similarly high level policy u its empowered to 
monitor the planning for and development of key e ergy facilities. 125 
The composition of the Council, its mandate, and in eed its very exis-
tence, at once reflect the tensions between energy upply, consumer 
needs, industrial needs, and environmental protecti n objectives. The 
immediate challenge for the Council and its staff is 0 develop the ex-
pertise necessary for a critical review of the long range plans sub-
mitted by the energy companies.126 It remains to be seen whether the 
Council will zealously employ its mandate to strive to compeP27 the 
energy companies subject to its jurisdiction to b precise in their 
long-range planning, to use less harmful and more efficient forms of 
123 G.L. c. 164, § 69K. Under the statute: "A certificate, if issu ,shall be in the form 
of a composite of all individual permits, approvals or autho izations which would 
otherwise be necessary for the construction and operation of the cility .... " Id. 
124 See G.L. c. 40B, § 23. 
125 A number of states have enacted legislation conferring co prehensive policy set-
ting, planning and/or regulatory authority upon a single state en 'ty. For a discussion of 
these measures and the motivation which led to the creation t ereof, see: Bronstein, 
Stale ReguloJion W Puwerplnnt SUing, 3 ENV. L. 273 (1973); Luce, uwer fOT Tomurrow: The 
Siting Dilemma, 1 ENv. L. 60 (1970); Ramey, Old and New Concep in Siting and Licensing 
Nuclear Power Plants, 9 FORUM '211 (1973); see also Ramey Murray, Delays and 
Bottlenecks in the Licensing Process Affecting Utilities: The Role W Impr ved Procedures and Ad-
vance Planning, 1970 DU. KE L.J. 25. For a listing of other law revi~ articles on point see 
Note, 52 N.D. L. REV. 703, 704-05 n.ll (1976). In recent years growing attention has 
been paid to the myriad regulatory procedures (federal, state a d local) that apply to 
the siting of key facilities of all kinds. One outgrowth of this concern has been an 
American Bar Association recommendation that states consider e establishment of a 
high-level body, such as the Energy Facilities Siting Council, to p ovide an ability to re-
solve virtually all environmental and developmental conflicts. Sp ial Committee on En-
vironmental Law (Industrial Siting), American Bar Association, D elopment and the Envi-
ronment: Legal Reforms to Facilitate Industrial Site Selection (Final port 1974). For a dis-
cussion of the American Bar Association report see Comment 55 NEB. L. REV. 440 
(1976), . 
128 The Council has developed several documents to facilitate e review of forecasts 
submitted to it. See, e.g., Energy Facilities Siting Council, Gas S t: A Compilation of 
Long Range Forecasts From Massachwetts Gas Company Reports ( ay 1976); and Energy 
Facilities Siting Council, Electrical Energy: A Compilation of Long Ra ge Forecasts From Mas-
sachwetts Utility Company Reports (May 1976). 
127 It would appear'that such influence upon the activities of e ergy companies would 
be most effectively brought to bear through the Council's det rminations upon fore-
casts submitted to it, see note 52 and accompanying text supra, and would be based 
upon an interpretation of the Council's statutory mandate. See n te 13 and accompany-
ing text supra. 
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energy supply and technology, and to force energy companies to dis-
courage energy extravagance by their consumers. And, it also re-
mains to be seen how judiciously the Council, in the exercise of its 
certificate authority, treats appeals taken from the determinations of 
state and local governmental units. The full reach of the Council's 
jurisdiction is somewhat uncertain at this juncture. By nature, energy 
supply activities necessarily entail arrangements that transcend state 
and national boundaries. Thus, many, if not all, of the energy com-
panies subject to the Council's jurisdiction are also subject to the exer-
cise of federal energy jurisdiction. It remains to be seen how far the 
Council can extend its jurisdiction into areas in which the federal 
jurisdiction is exclusive because of preemption or because of other 
constitutional impediments. 128 
B. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
§16.3. Introduction. The 1973 Survey 1 contained an extensive 
analysis of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972 (the "federal Act"),2 and the Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, as 
amended (the "state Act"),3 which emphasized the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits4 and the 'joint per-
'28 There is some uncertainty as to the range of the jurisdiction actually enjoyed by 
the Council and similar entities in other states. It has been suggested that the jurisdic-
tion of such entities could be circumscribed by judicial interpretations that the state 
agency's action or its enabling legislation contravenes the federal constitution, either be-
cause the state action placed an undue burden on interstate commerce or because it 
contravened an area of federal preemption. Note, 52 N.D.L. REV. 703, 704 n. 10 
(1976). See also Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and The 
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption 69-99. (Atomic Indus. F., Inc. Nov. 1975). 
The jurisdiction of the Council has already been subjected to such a challenge. Ten-
neco, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
Civ. Act. No. 76-1662G (D. Mass. April 28, 1976). The plaintiff in that action is a com-
pany engaged in the interstate pumping of gas through pipeline facilities which have 
been the subject of certificates of public convenience and necess:ty issued by the Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717 et seq. (1970). 
The plaintiff has asserted that by the enactment of that Act, Congress has preempted 
the field of the regulation of transshipment of natural gas in interstate commerce, that 
the requirements that these facilities also be approved by the Council is duplicative of 
the FPC requirements, and that the Massachusetts regulation places an undue burden 
on interstate commerce. 
§16.3.' See O'Brien & Deland, Environmental Law, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW. §§ 
6.2-6.6, at 144-76. 
233 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). 
3 G.L. c. 21, §§26-53, as amended through Acts of 1975, c. 706, §71. 
433 U.S.C. §1311(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). Briefly, the federal Act prohibits the discharge 
of effluents into the Nation's waterways unless authorized by a permit issued pursuant 
to §1311(a). The NPDES permit is based upon effluent limitations, which are quantities 
of certain pollutants that a source may discharge, See id. §1311(b), and water quality lim-
itations, which are founded on a technical conclusion of the requirements necessary to 
protect certain uses of the waters receiving the discharge, See id. §1312(a). Under the 
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mit" program being used in Massachusetts. 5 
During the 1976 Survey year, there was a shift in emphasis under 
the federal and state Acts from permit issuance, which spanned the 
1973-1975 Survey periods, to permit enforcement. In part, this can be 
attributed to significant decisions of the EPA Administrator6 and the 
federal courts7 regarding the deadlines imposed b~ the federal Act8 
and largely because of the increased efforts of the E~vironmental Pro-
tection Division of the Department of the Attorney qeneral. 
§16.4. Permit Enforcement. A critical issue whi~h the EPA faced 
after its long struggle to issue permits to industri~l dischargers was 
whether sources could meet compliance schedules phased to achieve 
the best practicable control technology currently available ("BPT") by 
July 1, 1977. 1 That issue was first addressed in an opinion of the EPA 
Administrator issued on September 30, 1975 in the matter of the 
NPDES Permit for the Bethlehem, Pennsylvania Plant, Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation (In Re Bethlehem Steel). 2 I 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation (the "Permittee"), intDecember, 1974, 
was issued a discharge permit which required its fadity to achieve the 
final permit conditions by July 1, 1977.3 At a publ c hearing on the 
draft permit, the Permittee argued that to meet t is deadline, con-
struction would have to be completed by April 1, 19.7. It claimed that 
, 
federal Act's phased program, by July I, 1977, a publicly-owned treatment works must 
provide a minimum of secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator of the EPA 
at 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1976) 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(B) (Supp. IV 1974), while all 
other dischargers must achieve the best practicable control technology currently avail-
able ("BPT") by the same date. Id. § 1311(b)(I)(B). By July I, 1983 (Phase II), publicly-
owned plants must. utilize the best practicable waste treatment technology in order to 
qualify for a discharge permit id. at § 1311(b)(2)(B); dischargers other than publicly-
owned treatment works must apply the best available technolo~ economically achiev-
able by that date.ld. § 1311(b)(2)(A). ! 
5 After Massachusetts' interim authority to issue discharge permits under 33 U .S.C. 
§ 1342(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1974), terminated, an agreement was ~xecuted between the 
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") Region II and the Division of 
Water Pollution Control, the agency chaq~ed with administering the state Act, (the 
"DWPC"), whereby state and federal perm1ts to a point source were in a single inte-
grated document known as a '10int permit." For a detailed explanation of the joint 
permit process, see O'Brien & Deland, Environmental Law, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 
6.3, at 150-55. 
6 In re NPDES Permit Bethlehem, Pennsylvania Plant, Bethlehem Steel Corp., Docket 
No. PA-AH-0058, 9 E.R.C. 1063 (1975), petition/or review dismisSjSUb. nom., Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 663, 9 E.R.C. H20, 1425 (3d ir. 1976). 
7 State Water Control Board v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 146, 8 E.R. . 1609,6 E.L.R. 20243 
(E.D. Va., 1976). 
8 See note 4 supra. 
§16.4. 1 See §11.3, note 4 supra. 
2 In re NPDES Permit Bethlehem, Pennsylvania Plant, Bethlehem Steel Corp., Docket 
No. PA-AH-0058, 9 E.R.C. 1063 (1975), petition/or review dismissed sub. nom., Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 663, 9 E.R.C. H20, 1425 (3d CiT. 1976). 
3 9 E.R.C. at 1064. 
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this would be physically impossible, despite good faith efforts, and the 
earliest date it could achieve the standards was January 1, 1979 
("Phase I") and July 1, 1979 ("Phase II"). In an attempt to win an 
extension of the compliance date, on January 16, 1975 the Permittee re-
quested an adjudicatory hearing on the issue of whether EPA may 
establish an effective date for final permit conditions later than July 1, 
1977, where those conditions are based on BPT and water quality 
standards.4 The question was referred to the EPA General Counsel as 
a certified issue of law, and on July 24, 1975, the General Counsel 
concluded that the Administrator has no discretion to extend the 
statutory compliance date. The conclusion of law was subsequently 
adopted by the Regional Administrator, Region III, and a petition for 
review of that decision was filed. 5 In response to the Permittee's con-
tention that the July 1, 1977 compliance date is merely an interim 
date set by Congress for achieving the ultimate objectives and goals of 
the federal Act by 1983 and 1985, the Administrator concluded that 
based on his examination of the statutory language, as well as its legis-
lative history, the conclusion of the General Counsel should stand 
and, therefore, the permit, with a final date of July 1, 1977, should 
take effect immediately.6 
Akin to the statutory standard that industrial dischargers achieve 
BPT on or before July 1, 1977, is a requirement that municipal dis-
chargers achieve a minimum of secondary treatment by the same 
date. The first judicial decision affirming that compliance date was is-
sued in State Water Control Board v. Train,1 on February 6, 1976.8 The 
action was brought by an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia on 
behalf of its municipalities to obtain relief from the July 1, 1977 dead-
line.9 It was the Water Control Board's contention that publicly-
owned treatment works need not comply with otherwise applicable 
effluent discharge limitations until such time as (1) federal grant as-
sistance is available in the amount of seventy-five percent of the eligi-
ble cost of construction of said works, and (2) a reasonable time has 
been afforded to complete the necessary construction. lo 
4Id. 
SId. 
6Id. After the end of the Survey year but prior to publication, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed Bethlehem Steel Corporation's petition for 
review. 544 F.2d 657, 663, 9 E.R.C. 1420, 1425 (3d Cir. 1976). The court concluded 
that on the basis of the legislative history and adjudicated cases, the EPA is without au-
thority to grant an extension beyond the July I, 1977 date in NPDES permits. Id., citing 
State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 146, 8 E.R.C. 1609, 6 E.L.R. 20243 
(E.D. Va. 1976), which case is discussed at notes 7-25 infra. 
7424 F. Supp. 146, 8 E.R.C. 1609, 6 E.L.R. 20243 (E.D.Va. 1976). 
8Id. 
9Id. at 147, 8 E.R.C. at 1609,6 E.L.R. at 20243. 
10Id. The basis for this argument is found in a section of the Act which provides for 
federal grants to help construct treatment facilities. 33 U.S.c. § 1281(g)(l) (Supp. IV 
1974). The provision authorizes grants amounting to 75% of the construction cost of 
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i 
Plaintiffs argument that the discharge limitations frr municipal dis-
chargers are inextricably linked to the funding provisions was 
founded on its construction of the federal Act, as well as the legisla-
tive history and the policy behind that Act. Plain tiE[ postulated that 
when Congress appropriated $18 billion for publicly-owned treatment 
works for fiscal years 1973, 1974, and 1975, Congress estimated that 
that would cover the federal share of the anticipated cost of com-
plianceY Plaintiff buttressed this assertion with com~ents made dur-
ing the floor debate on the House version of th~ bill. 12 Plaintiff 
further noted that one provision of the Act authorizes reimbursement 
for funds expended prior to the Act on publicly-?wned treatment 
works,13 whereas there is no similar reimbursement provision for proj-
ects commenced after the effective date of the Act. This, plaintiff in-
dicated, was further evidence that Congress believed the $18 billion 
appropriated would be sufficient to cover the fed~ral share of the 
construction cost.14 Plaintiff concluded that since ¢ongress did not 
wish to tax the limited financial resources of municipalities, Congress 
must have intended to condition the duty to compl); with the Act on 
the availability of the federal share of funds. IS i 
The State Water Control Board court agreed that the~e was support in 
the legislative history both for plaintiffs premise that Congress be-
lieved that $18 billion would be sufficient to cover th¢ federal share of 
all necessary public construction as well as plaintiWs premise that 
Congress did not intend to place unreasonable financial burdens on 
municipalities. 16 The court stated, however, that those two factors 
, 
! 
the project. /d. §1282(a). Once a treatment works project receive's the approval of the 
Administrator of the EPA with regard to plans, specifications, and cost estimates, the 
United States becomes contractually obligated to pay its proportional contribution to the 
project. /d. §§1282(a), 1283(a). There is a considerable lag time, however, between ap-
proval of the project and actual receipt of funds. 424 F. Supp. at ~49, 8 E.R.C. at 1611, 
6 E.L.R. at 20244. Moreover, the plaintiff pointed out that there simply were not 
enough funds authorized under the Act to provide 75% grants to each project. /d. 
11 424 F. Supp. at 153, 8 E.R.C. at 1614, 6 E.L.R. at 20245.' See 33 U.S.C. §1287 
(Supp. IV 1974). ! 
12 424 F. Supp. at 153, 8 E.R.C. at 1614, 6 E.L.R. at 20245. For example, plaintiff 
noted that one congressman stated "[tlhe $18 billion provided in this bill is a realistic 
figure of the funding that will be needed to get the job done,'id. See 92 CONG. REC. 
10210 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Grover), reprinted in SEN. COMM. N PUBLIC WORKS, 93D 
CONG., 1ST SESS .. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION ONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972, at 367 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORyl. Another con-
gressman was quoted as stating that "we will not lure them out on a limb only to saw it 
off behind them for want of available funds," 424 F. Supp. at 15;, 8 E.R.C. at 1615, 6 
E.L.R. at 20246. See 92 CONG. REC. 10756 (1972) (remarks of Re . Wright), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,supra at 628. 
13 424 F_ Supp_ at 153, 8 E.R.C. at 1615, 6 E.L.R. at 20246, citing 33 U.S.C. §1286 
(Supp. IV 1974). 
14424 F. Supp. at 153, 8 E.R.C. at 1615, 6 E.L.R. at 20246. 
IS/d. , 8 E.R.C. at 1614, 6 E.L.R. at 20245. 
IBId. at 154, 8 E.R.C. at 1615, 6 E.L.R. at 20246. 
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alone did not "clearly establish that the congressional solution to this 
dilemma would be conditioning compliance upon obtaining federal 
funds."17 
First the court noted that the language of the Act evidenced a clear 
intent by Congress that the duties of municipalities to comply with the 
effluent limitations and deadlines were to be strictly adhered to. IS The 
court found the funding provisions to be equally clear,19 and, further, 
that neither of the enforcement sections of the Act20 conditioned the 
powers for enforcement conferred therein upon federal funding. 21 
Thus, applying the "plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation, 
the court rejected plaintiffs construction of the Act.22 
The court further buttressed its conclusion by noting that the legis-
lative history of the Act showed that Congress was aware that the fed-
eral funding might be inadequate.23 Moreover, the court pointed out 
that Congress was presented with and rejected a proposal which 
would have conditioned compliance upon the availability of federal 
funding. 24 Absent explicit statutory language, the court was unwilling 
to depart from its conceived responsibility to uphold the Act's strict 
standards and guidelines. It therefore refused to establish the possibil-
ity of an exception to compliance as proposed by the plaintiff. 25 The 
alternatives to strict compliance with the Act, the court stated, were 
matters appropriately left to Congress for consideration.26 
17Id. 
181d. at 150, 8 E.R.C. at 1612, 6 E.L.R. at 20244. The court found the following 
statement of Senator Montoya to be indicative of Congress' intent: "This bill contains 
deadlines and it imposes rather tough standards on industry [and] municipalities .... 
Only under such conditions are we likely to press the technological threshold of inven-
tion into new and imaginative developments that will allow us to meet the objectives 
stated in our bill." Id. at 151, 8 E.R.C. at 1613, 6 E.L.R. at 20245. See 92 CONGo REC. 
38808 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 12, at 1278. 
19 424 F. Supp. at 151, 8 E.R.C. at 1613, 6 E.L.R. at 20245. 
20 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3), 1365 (Supp. IV 1974). 
21424 F. Supp. at 152,8 E.R.C. at 1614, 6 E.L.R. at 20245. 
221d. 
2ald. at 154-55, 8 E.R.C. at 1615-16,6 E.L.R. at 20246. 
2<Id. at 155, 8 E.R.C. at 1616, 6 E.L.R. at 20246. Among those urging flexibility were 
former EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus and Administrator Train. In tes-
timony given before the House Committee on Public Works, Train stated "[s]ome pro-
vision should be made, however, for an extension of the 1976 deadlines for facilities 
where it cannot be achieved despite the best good faith efforts." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 12, at 1115. Ruckelshaus was even more emphatic: "a 2-year extension from 
the 1976 deadline will be necessary for some industrial sources. Similarly, we are of the 
view that all municipal sources in existence in 1976 cannot achieve secondary treatment; 
the secondary treatment requirement should only apply to projects for which Federal 
grants are provided." "Letter from Ruckelshaus to John A. Blatnik, Chairman, House 
Committee on Public Works, dated December 13, 1971, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. 
supra note 12, at 1197. 
25 424 F. Supp. at 155, 8 E.R.C. at 1616,6 E.L.R. at 20246. 
261d. at 156,8 E.R.C. at 1617,6 E.L.R. at 20247. 
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§16.5. National Policy on Industrial and Munici:ipal Dischargers 
Failing to Meet July 1, 1977 BPT and Secondary iTreatment Dead-
lines. Prompted, in part, by federal decisions h~lding that there 
can be no issuance of permits which do not requite compliance by 
July 1, 1977 with the best practicable control tecij.nology currently 
available ("BPT") or secondary treatment requiremtnts,l and by the 
recognition that some industrial and municipal discHargers would not 
physically achieve the limitations set forth in the Feqeral Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972 (the "federal Act")2 the EPA 
issued a series of memoranda establishing a federallenforcement pol-
icy with regard to such dischargers.3 I 
The policy memoranda attempt to draw a distin9tion between dis-
chargers whose failure to achieve BPT or a minim:um of secondary 
treatment is occasioned in whole or in part by its cl>wn lack of good 
faith efforts to comply, and those who have proceeqed in good faith, 
but cannot physically achieve compliance. In those lOstances where a 
lack of good faith effort is evident, the memoranda s~ate that the trad-
itional enforcement tools provided in the federal A¢t4 should be vig-
, 
§16.5 1 In re NPDES Permit Bethlehem, Pennsylvania Plant, ~ethlehem Steel Corp., 
Docket No. PA-AH-0058, 9 E.~.C. 1063 (1975), petition for rel'ew dismissed sub nom., 
Bethlehem Steel v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 663, 9 E.R.C. 1420, 142 (3d Cir. 1976); State 
Water Control Bd. v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 146, 8 E.R.C. 1609, 6 .L.R. 20243 (E.D. Va. 
1976). For a further discussion of Bethlehem and State Water Co:'ltrol Board, see §16.4 
supra. 
233 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). For a discussion of a case in which a dis-
charger claimed it could not physically achieve the limitations s</t forth in the federal 
Act see text at notes 3-4 of § 16.4 supra. : 
3 "Enforcement Actions Where an Industrial Discharger Fail~ to Meet the July I, 
1977, Statutory Deadline for Achieving Best Practicable ControljTechnology or Other 
Applicable Effluent Limitations," Stanley W. Legro, Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement, EPA, to Regional Administrators, EPA Oune 3, 19~6) [hereinafter Mem-
orandum on Industrial Dischargers1; "Enforcement Actions IAgainst a Municipal 
Discharger that Fails to Meet the July I, 1977, Statutory Deadlin~ for Achieving Secon-
dary Treatment Where the Municipal Discharger is Currently FlImded for a Step I, 2 
and/or 3 Construction Grant Directed Toward Achieving Second ry Treatment or Oc-
cupies a Position on a Priority List Such that It Can Reasonably e Expected to Be so 
Funded Prior to July I, 1977," Stanley W. Legro, Assistant Adm nistrator for Enforce-
ment, EPA, to Regional Administrators, EPA Oune 3, 1976) [her inafter Memorandum 
on Municipal Dischargers1; and "Procedures for Issuance of En rcement Compliance 
Schedule Letters," Stanley W. Legro, Assistant Administrator for nforcement, EPA, to 
Regional Administrators, EPA Oune 3, 1976) [hereinafter Me orandum on ECSLs1. 
These memoranda have been published at [1976-197717 ENVIR. EP. (BNA) 241-245. In 
December, 1975, EPA proposed a policy which would have gra ted extensions to cer-
tain publicly-owned waste water treatment works only. At that ti e, congressional staff-
ers and the Natural Resources Defense Council openly criticized the proposal as being 
illegal. See [1975-19761 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1345. For unstated r asons, but apparently 
because of concerns expressed by the congressional staff, th~ policy was not im-
plemented. See id. at 1380. ! 
4 The Act authorizes the EPA Administrator, inter alia, to bringl a civil action for per-
manent or temporary injunctive relief for certain violations or the Act. 33 U.S.C. 
§1319(b)(Supp. IV 1974). Moreover, violators of some of the A!:t's provisions may be 
liable for civil and criminal penalties. /d. §1319(c)-(d). ' 
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orously applied to (1) preserve the integrity of the NPDES permit 
program, (2) make all dischargers aware that the Act's Phase II dead-
liness will also be strictly enforced, and (3) provided equitable treat-
ment to the vast majority of dischargers who have moved quickly and 
cooperatively to install necessary control technology to meet the 
statutory deadline. 6 Failure to vigorously enforce the deadline, the 
memoranda conclude, would afford undue and unfair advantages to 
those recalcitrant dischargers who have delayed the installation of re-
quired equipment without good cause, allowing them to profit 
through postponement of capital and operating costS.7 
Industrial dischargers. According to the EPA policy, a discharger that 
has proceeded in good faith but which does not have a finally effec-
tive permit and which cannot achieve BPT by July 1, 1977 should be 
simultaneously issued (1) a permit requiring BPT by July 1, 1977, and 
(2) an Enforcement Compliance Schedule Letter ("ECSL") establishing 
a compliance schedule to achieve BPT in the shortest reasonable 
period of time after July 1, 1977.8 The ECSL shall, in addition, state 
the permit issuing authority's intention to refrain from enforcing the 
July 1, 1977 date as long as the discharger complies with the terms of 
the ECSL and all terms of its permit, other than that requiring BPT 
by July 1, 1977.9 
Municipal dischargers. With regard to a municipal discharger who (1) 
does not have a finally effective permit (or has a permit expiring prior 
to July 1, 1977, which must be reissued), cannot achieve secondary 
treatment by July 1, 1977, and is currently funded for a construction 
grant directed toward achieving a minimum of secondary treatment, 
or (2) occupies a position on a priority list such that it can reasonably 
be expected to be so funded prior to July 1, 1977 from funds au-
thorized under the federal Act, the June 3, 1976 policy statement 
provides that a permit requiring a minimum of secondary treatment 
by July 1, 1977 and an ECSL which establishes a schedule to achieve 
that level of treatment in the shortest reasonable period of time after 
July 1, 1977 should be simultaneously issued. tO As with industrial dis-
chargers, the ECSL for municipal dischargers would contain lan-
guage reflecting the issuing authority's nonenforcement posture 
where the terms of the ECSL and the permit (except for the July 1, 
1977 deadline) are met,u 
5 [d. §1311(b)(2)(A)-(B). See note 4 at §16.3 supra. 
6Id. §1311(b)(I)(A)-(B). See note 4 at §16.3 supra. 
7 Memorandum on Industrial Dischargers, supra note 3, [1976-1977] 7 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) at 241; Memorandum on Municipal Dischargers, supra note 3, [1976-19771 7 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 243. 
8 Memorandum on Industrial Dischargers, supra note 3, [1976-19771 7 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) at 242. 
9 [d. 
10 Memorandum on Municipal Dischargers, supra note 3, [1976-19771 7 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) at 243-44. 
11 [d. at 244. 
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In the case of both industrial and municipal discl~argers, an ECSL 
may not be issued unless the discharger has submitted (1) documented 
evidence that, despite all efforts I1.lade in good faith, ,it cannot achieve 
the final effluent limitations in the permit by July 1 ( 1977, and (2) a 
construction management analysis of the shortest reasonable schedule 
by which such limitations can be achieved. 12 Whene~er an ECSL is to 
be used in connection with a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System ("NPDES") permit, the ECSL must be subject Ito the same pub-
lic participation requirements as the permit. 13 Also, where an ECSL is 
to be issued by a state with an approved NPDES p~ogram, the letter 
will not be binding upon the EPA.l4 Therefore, a source receiving 
such an ECSL should insist on EPA being a joint signator. Finally, it 
should be noted that any issued ECSL must contai~ a statement that 
its issuance does not preclude enforcement of the underlying permit 
by third parties under the citizen suit provision of th¢ federal Act. l :> 
The ECSL policy was severely criticized by congressional staff mem-
bers, many of whom had a major role in drafting the federal Act. 16 
Most characterized the announced exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
by EPA as a "nonenforcement" policy that was contqtry to the express 
provisions of the law, clearly beyond the purview of an administrative 
agency, and only available to CongressY One seniof] senate staff aide 
challenged the policy, stating that the EPA was guilty of "deliberate, 
systematic misinterpretation and misapplication of the law."ls He 
noted that the federal Act clearly limited the EP~ Administrator's 
flexibility in enforcing the provisions of the Act and required efforts 
at compliance beyond those specific limits to bel pursued in the 
courtS. 19 The result of EPA's policy, he said, is that negotiations will 
be conducted beyond the visibility of the judicial prpcess and without 
sanctions envisioned by the Act.20 
§ 16.6. Joint Perrmt Enforcement in the Commorwealth. During 
the Survey year, the Environmental Protection Division, Department of 
the Attorney General (the "Division"), initiated a s~gnificant number 
of suits to enforce the provisions of joint discharge I permits. I In sup-
port of that effort, the EPA made a grant of $86,000 during the 1976 
fiscal year to provide for additional enforcement caplability.2 
12 Memorandum on ECSLs, supra note 3, [1976-1977] 7 ENVIR. hEP. (BNA) at 244. 
13 [d. at 245. 
14 [d. 
15 [d. See 33 U.S.C. §1365 (Supp. IV 1974). 
16 [1976-1977]7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 220. 
17 [d. at 220, 289. I 
18/d. at 289. Statement of Leon G. Billings who was instrumental in writing the Act as 
an aide to Senator Edmund S. Muskie. [d. I 
19 [1976-1977] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 289. ! 
20 [d. 
§16.6. I See MASS. ATTY. GEN. FISCAL 1976 ANN. REP. 4,8-9. 
2 [d. at 1. 
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In what has been perhaps its most significant case to date under the 
state Act, the Division brought suit to enforce a joint discharge permit 
against the City of Revere. 3 The case served notice on the 
municipalities of the Commonwealth that despite the financial and 
political problems associated with municipal government, cities and 
towns would be held accountable for their failure to comply with the 
strict performance schedules in the joint water discharge permits. 
The case against Revere arose out of the terms of a December 1974 
joint permit which required, inter alia, for investigation and correction 
of problems with sewage being introduced into the storm drainage 
system in the Point of Pines area of the City.4 The complaint, filed in 
March 1976 charged the City with violating the compliance schedule 
set forth in its permit and sought $10,000 a day in fines for each day 
of violation of state and federal orders which provided a revised 
schedule for completion of the necessary work by July 1, 1975.5 What 
is significant about this case, in addition to its being the first action 
against a municipal permittee, was the Division's insistence that the 
judgment include liquidated damages provisions6 and establish a size-
able escrow accoune to assure completion of the agreed to tasks. It 
appears that these sanctions may be more effective than the tradi-
tional administrative order and civil suits which require lengthy pro-
ceedings before issuance and subsequent action to enforce, since they 
require the City to guarantee its own performance and vest the con-
trol over its financial commitment directly in the Environmental Pro-
tection Division. 
C. SAFE DRINKING WATER SUPPLY 
§ 16.7. Safe Drinking Water Act: Introduction. Because of its po-
tential impact on the Commonwealth, the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(the "Act")l and proposed implementing regulations2 were analyzed 
extensively in the 1975 Survey.3 During the 1976 Survey year, the En-
3 Division of Water Pollution Control v. Revere, Civil No. 13424 (Super. Ct. Mass., 
April 12, 1976). 
• Complaint, Division of Water Pollution Control v. Revere, Civil No. 13424 (Super. 
Ct. Mass., filed March 30, 1976). 
5Id. 
6 The consent judgment required the City of Revere to pay the Commonwealth 
$1,000 for each day of noncompliance with the terms of said judgment. Division of 
Water Pollution Control, (consent judgment). In the event the City failed to make pay-
ment within fourteen days of receipt of a demand of the Attorney General for payment 
based on a violation of the judgment, the Commonwealth would not be bound by the 
damage limits established in the judgment. /d. 
7 The escrow account, to be administered by the Department of the Attorney Gen-
eral, was $50,000. Division of Water Pollution Control (consent judgment). 
§16.7. 142 U.S.C. §300f et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). 
240 Fed. Reg. 11994,33224,33232 (1975). 
3 See O'Brien & Thompson, Environmental Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§18.8-
18.11, at 490-502. 
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vironmental Protection Agency (the EPA), the federal agency charged 
with responsibility for administering the Act, promulgated several reg-
ylations which will have a significant impact on the I Commonwealth'~ 
drinking water program and the Commonwealth's cqntinued access to 
federal assistance. In this period, the Commonwealt~ received its first 
award of grant assistance to develop an effective public water system 
supervision program and began its efforts to assume primary en-
forcement responsibility for the Act in the state. . . 
. § 16.8. Safe Drinking Water Act: Federal I~~lementation. Na-
tional Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations. O~ March 14,. 19.75, 
the EPA had proposed national interim primary drinking water stim-
dards1 as required by the Safe Drinking Water Act (the "Act").2 Sub-
sequently, the final interim standards were published on December 
24, 1975,3 and become effective on June 24, 1977.4 tlThey include sev-
eral significant changes which are particulaIily impor ant for th~ Com-
monwealth's drinking water program. i. 
Because Massachusetts experiences a substantial amount of tourist 
trade, the modifications of the definition of water systems covered are 
pertinent. The Act applies to public and private systems having at 
least fifteen service connections or regularly servi1' at least twenty-
five individuals, which systems provide piped water to the public for 
human consumption.5 In an effort to interpret th meaning of reg-
ular service, EPA's proposed interim standards include service for as 
much as three months a year.6 Since this would have excluded 
facilities serving tourists which are open slightly les~ than this period 
each year, the final version covers systems serving! an average of at 
least twenty-five individuals at least sixty days out ofi a year. 7 Since the 
health effects of a contaminant may vary with the frequency of con-
sumption, the regulations established two categories of public water 
systems-those serving residents (community water system) and those 
serving transients or intermittent users (noncommunhy water system).8 
A community water system is defined as a system w~ich serves at least 
fifteen service connections used by year-round resi~ents or serves at 
least twenty-five year-round residents.9 Noncommunity systems are 
basically those which serve transients. They include hotels, restaurants, 
§16.8. '40 Fed. Reg. 11994 (1975). See O'Brien & Thomps n, Environmental Law, 
1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §18.11, 498-502. I 
242 U.S.C. §300g-1 (Supp. IV 1974). 
340 C.F.R. Part 141 (1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 59566·(1975). The interim standards are 
based largely on the Public Health Service's 1962 Drinking Water Standards. Id. at 
59567. 
• 40 Fed. Reg. 59569 (1975). 
• 42 U.S.C. §300f(4) (Supp. IV 1974). 
640 Fed. Reg. 11994, 11994 (1975). 
740 C.F.R. §141.2(e) (1976),40 Fed. Reg. 59566, 59566 (1975). 
8Id. 
940 C.F.R. §141.2(e)(i) (1976). 
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campgrounds, service stations and other public accommodations which 
have at least fifteen service connections or serve water to a daily aver-
age of at least twenty-five persons.10 While the proposed regulations 
would have applied all maximum contaminant levels to both 
categories,ll the final version exempts noncommunity systems from 
maximum contaminant levels for organic chemicals and for inorganic 
chemicals other than nitrates12 because such levels were based on 
long-term exposures and, thus, are not needed to protect transients or 
intermittent users.13 
Th~ second major area of change in the final regulations is in the 
maximum contaminant levels. Three such levels have been deleted 
and several wefe rejected despite urgings for their inclusion. 14 First, 
the proposed level for the bacterial plate count was eliminated because 
the EPA determined that the coliform and turbidity levels adequately 
address bacterial contamination.15 Second, the level for cyanide was 
eliminated since historical data showed that no system studied revealed 
the presence of cyanide at a level greater than one-thousandth of the level 
at which it is toxic to humans. 16 It was determined that toxic levels of 
cyanide would be present in ~ water system only as a result of an accidental 
spillage (such as a barge collision) and, therefore, could be more effec-
tively dealt with by emergency powers conferred under the Act. 17 
The third, and most controversiaP8 of the deletions from the pro-
posed regulations was the elimination of a maximum contaminant 
level of .7 milligrams per liter for the total concentration of organic 
10 [d. §141.2(e)(ii} (1976), 40 Fed. Reg. 59566, 59566 (1975). 
11 40 Fed. Reg. 11994, 11994-95 (1975). 
12 The nitrate levels were retained because they can have adverse health effects on 
susceptible infants in a short period of time. [d. at 59566. 
13 40 C.F.R. §§141.11-141.14; 40 Fed. Reg. 59566, 59566 (1975). The EPA analyzed 
the economic and inflationary impacts of the Interim Primary Drinking Regulations and 
concluded that the capital costs to community systems to achieve compliance will range 
between $1 billion and $1.8 billion. Noncommunity systems will have to invest an addi-
tional $24 million. 40 Fed. Reg. at 59569. 
14 40 Fed. Reg. at 59567 (1975). 
15 See id. The EPA, however, endorsed its use as an operational tool in conjunction 
with the coliform tests to assess the bacteriological quality of drinking water. [d. 
16 [d. 
17 [d. See 42 U.S.C. §300i(a) (Supp. IV 1974), which section empowers the EPA Ad-
ministrator, upon receipt of information that a contaminant poses an imminent and 
substantial danger to the health of persons, to initiate abatement efforts. Orders may be 
issued under this authority notwithstanding existing regulations, variances, exemptions, 
or other requirements under the Act. 
18 On December 17, 1975 (after a release of the national interim standards, but prior 
to publication in the Federal Register), the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") filed 
suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia seeking to have 
the regulations remanded to the EPA for inclusion of an organics standard and to cure 
other deficiencies, including the failure to require adequate disinfection procedures to 
control viruses and other disease-causing organisms, and failure to set maximum levels 
for certain toxic substances (asbestos, dieldrin and sodium). See [1975-1976] 6 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 1412. 
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chemicals, as determined by the carbon chlorofor~ extract method 
("CCE").19 The EPA stated that Congress had anticipated that organic 
chemicals would be addressed in the Revised Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations because of the lack of accurate data on ~he large number 
of organic chemicals and the uncertainties of prop~r treatment tech-
niques.2o Under these circumstances, the EPA adopted the CCE stan-
dard as an interim measure, pending developme3t of the Revised 
Primary Regulations.21 However, according to expe s commenting on 
the proposed standard, CCE has many failings a an indicator of 
health effects of organic chemicals.22 First, they argued that the test 
gathers data on only a small portion of the total or~rnics in the water 
sampled.23 In addition, the experts claimed that CC-9 was unreliable in 
identifying those organics most suspected of adverse health effects 
and that there was "no existing data on which a specific level for CCE 
can be set on a rational basis."24 Thus, according to tPA: 
To establish a maximum contaminant level undelr these circum-
stances would almost certainly do more harm than good. It could 
give a false sense of security to persons served by sYftems which are 
within the established level and a false sense of afarm to persons 
served by systems which exceed the level. It also would divert re-
sources from efforts to find more effective ways of dealing with 
the organic chemicals problem.25 
The EPA's approach to the issue of organics is to Irequire an inten-
sive monitoring and sample analysis effort26 and to embark on an ex-
tensive research program.27 
19 40 Fed. Reg. at 59568 (1975). 
20 [d. See 42 U.S.C. §300g-1 (Supp. IV 1974). I 
21 40 Fed. Reg. at 59568 (1975). I 
22 [d. at 59568. The CCE standard was first developed as a test for undesirable tastes 
and odors in drinking water. [d. 
23 40 Fed. Reg. at 59568 (1975). 
24 [d. 
uM I 
26 40 C.F.R. §14L40 (1976). These activities are to be conduded under authority of 
42 U.S.C. §§300j-4 and 300j-9 (Supp. IV 1974). See 40 Fed. Reg. at 59568, 59587-88 
(1975). 
27 The program is intended to answer the following four questibns: 
I. What are the effects of commonly occurring organic co1npounds on human 
health? 
2. What analytical procedures should be used to monitor finished drinking water 
to assure that any Primary Drinking Water Regulations dealirg with organics are 
met? 
3. Because some of these organic compounds are formed during water treat-
ment, what changes in treatment practices are required to minimize the formation 
of these compounds in treated water? , 
4. What treatment technology must be applied to reduce cfmtaminant levels to 
concentrations that may be specified in the Primary Drinking '!Vater Regulations? 
40 Fed. Reg. at 59568 (1975). 
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State Public Water System Supervision Program Grants. On August 7, 
1975, the EPA proposed regulations governing grants to assist states 
in the funding of public water supervision programs under the Act.28 
In the final regulations published on January 20, 1976,29 the EPA re-
tained the majority of the proposed provisions, including the follow-
ing formula for allocation of grant funds among the states: 30 
Population 
Land area 
Public water systems32 
30 percent31 
10 percent 
60 percent 
More importantly, for the Commonwealth,33 the final regulations have 
corrected a problem in the proposed regulations which could have led 
to a hiatus between the first and second awards of grant funds. The 
EPA had proposed that no grant award could be made to a state for 
any fiscal year subsequent to the state's first grant unless the state had 
assumed and was maintaining primary enforcement responsibility 
under the Act. 34 The EPA was persuaded, however, by the argument 
that the Act "does not prohibit the award of a second program grant 
to a State within 12 months of the first grant award, even if the State 
does not have [primary enforcement responsibility] at that time,"35 
and thus amended the regulations to permit the second award.36 The 
final regulation makes it clear, however, that in order to qualify for 
the second award, a state must demonstrate that it is moving toward 
assuming primary enforcement responsibility.37 
National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations Implementation. On 
January 20, 1976, the EPA published its final regulations implement-
ing the Act's primary drinking water regulations.38 Of prime im-
28 [d. at 33224. 
29 41 Fed. Reg. 2912 (1976). 
30 40 C.F.R. §35.605 (1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 2912, 2912 (1976). 
31 This allocation gives a weight factor or 30% and takes into account the population 
of each state in proportion to the total population of all states. 
32 This factor takes into account the number of public water systems in each state in 
proportion to the number of such systems in all states. The water systems statistics are 
drawn from EPA inventory forms and the predominant service area characteristic must 
include one of the following: community, company town, mobile home park, or an in-
stitution. 40 C.F.R. §35.605 (1976). 
33 See discussion of the Massachusetts effort to obtain primary enforcement re-
sponsibility at §16.9 infra. 
34 40 Fed. Reg. 33224 (1975). See 42 U.S.C. §300g-2(a) (Supp. IV 1974), for a de-
scription of what "primary enforcement responsibility" entails. Such responsibility in-
cludes the adoption and implementation of drinking water regulations which are at 
least as stringent as the national primary drinking water regulations. See §16.9, note 3 
infra. 
35 41 Fed. Reg. 2912, 2912 (1976). 
36 [d. See 40 C.F.R. § 35.613(b) (1976). 
37 40 C.F.R. §35.613(c) (1976). 
38 [d. Part 142,41 Fed. Reg. 2916, 2916 (1976). 
29
O'Brien and Thompson: Chapter 16: Environmental Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
I 
I 
572 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSErrtLAW §16.8 
portance to the Commonwealth are the provisions f 40 C.F.R. Part 
142, Subpart B, which establish the prerequisites fo approval of state 
programs for the enforcement of state drinking wat~r regulations. 
One of the notable additions to the proposed i plementing reg-
ulations is the inclusion of provisions to insure gre ter dissemination 
of information to the public and public participatio in the states' en-
forcement efforts. For example, the section dea ing with record-
keeping requirements has been expanded to req ire that records 
covered be maintained and made available for ublic inspection, 
either by the state or the appropriate public water systems.39 Also, a 
provision has been added requiring states to mak their annual re-
ports to the EPA available to the public.40 Finally, 0 C.F.R. §142.10 
has been revised to require public notification of vi lations by public 
water systems in order for a state's enforcemen program to be 
deemed adequate.41 
Another change from the proposed regulations hich will have a 
significant impact on the Commonwealth's plans for ssuming primary 
enforcement responsibility is the clarification of the extent of a state's 
legal authority. Section 142.1O(b)(6) has been exp nded to make it 
clear that in addition to such matters as the autho 'ty to adopt pri-
mary drinking water regulations that are at least a stringent as the 
federal standards, a state's legal authority must incl de: (I) the power 
to seek injunctions against violations of the state's tandards; (2) the 
right to require appropriate recordkeeping and re orting by public 
water systems covered; (3) the power to assess penal ies;42 and (4) the 
public notification requirements discussed in the I preceding para-
graph.43 I 
.39 [d. §142.14(f) (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. at 2916 (1976). 
40 [d. §142.15(d) (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. at 2916 (1976). 
u [d. §142.10(6)(v) (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. at 2916 (1976). Other amendments insuring 
wider distribution of public information are included in 40 C .. R. §§142.13, 142.23, 
142.44 and 142.54, and provide for notice in newspapers of pu lic hearings. 41 Fed. 
Reg. at 2916 (1976). 
42 Subparagraph (vi) of §142.1O(b)(6), provides that an app ovable state program 
.nust include authority to assess civil or criminal penalties for iolation of the state's 
primary drinking water regulations or public notification requ' ements. While states 
have been urged to adopt the penalty levels under the Act (up $5,000 per day civil 
penalty for a willful violation), a lower level, or different type 0 penalty will not pre-
clude qualifying for primary enforcement responsibility. EPA int nds to judge the ade-
quacy of penalties in light of the state's overall enforcement auth rity. See 41 Fed. Reg. 
at 2917 (1976). 
43 41 Fed. Reg. at 2917 (1976). The final regulations also cI rified the limits of a 
state's responsibilities to assume primary enforcement. Because of persuasive arguments 
from states, the EPA conceded that regulation of water on inters te carriers (airplanes, 
buses, trains) should remain the responsibility of the federal g vernment and, there-
fore, provided that a state could qualify for primary enforcement responsibility without 
regulating systems on interstate carriers. [d. See 40 C.F.R. §142.3 b)(l) (1976). In addi-
tion, systems on Indian lands remained the responsibility of the £ deral government. 40 
C.F.R. §142.3(b)(2) (1976). 
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§ 16.9. Safe Drinking Water Act: Primary Enforcement Re-
sponsibility for the Commonwealth. In May, 1976, the Common-
wealth was awarded its first grant under the Act! for development of 
a public water system supervision program. As a result of the final 
amendments to the grant regulations,2 it is anticipated that a second 
program grant will be made before the primary enforcement re-
sponsibilities are assumed.3 
By the end of the Survey year, significant progress had been made 
to align the Commonwealth's drinking water program with the federal 
requirements.4 These included efforts to develop a systematic sanitary 
survey program, the preparation of certification requirements for 
laboratories, efforts to revise existing regulations5 to conform to the 
Federal Interim Primary Regulations, and efforts to consolidate exist-
ing requirements. These regulations, which will be promulgated pur-
suant to section 2(28) of chapter 21 A, section 17 of chapter 92, and 
section 160 of chapter III of the General Laws shall be used to im-
§16.9. 1 Grants are made to states pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §300j-2(a)(2) (Supp. IV 
1974). 
240 C.F.R. §35.613 (1976). 
3 See text at §16.8, notes 34-36 supra. "Primary enforcement responsibilities" are de-
scribed at 42 U.S.C. §300g-2(a) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 infra. 
4 These requirements, promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §300g-2(a)(b) (Supp. IV 
1974), are as follows: (1) the adoption of regulations no less stringent than federal reg-
ulations, 40 C~F.R. §142.IO(a)(2) (1976); (2) the maintenance of an inventory of public 
water systems, id. §142.IO(b)(l); (3) the maintenance of a program for conducting sani-
tary surveys of public water systems, id. §142.IO(b)(2); (4) the maintenance of a pro-
gram to certify laboratories conducting analytical measurements of drinking water con-
taminants, or the establishment of a state laboratory for conducting such measurements, 
id. §142.IO(b)(3); (5) the establishment and maintenance of a program to review design 
and construction of new or modified systems, id. §142.10(b)(5); (6) the authority to 
apply state primary regulations to all public water systems covered by national primary 
standards, id. § 142.IO(b)(6)(i); (7) the authority to sue to enjoin threatened or continu-
ing violations of state regulations, id. §142.IO(b)(6)(ii); (8) the authority to inspect public 
water systems, including the right to take water samples, regardless of whether there is 
evidence of a violation, id. § 142.IO(b)(6)(iii); (9) the authority to require suppliers to 
keep records and make reports to the state, id. §142.10(b)(6)(iv); (10) the authority to 
require public water systems to give public notice of violations, id. §142.10(b)(6)(v); and 
(11) the authority to assess civil or criminal penalties including daily ones for continuing 
violations, id. §142.10(b)(6)(vi). Other requirements include the keeping of records and 
reporting of activities, and the authority to adopt a plan for the provision of safe drink-
ing water under emergency conditions. 42 U.S.C. §300g-2(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1974); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 142.IO(c),(e) (1976). In addition, if variances or exemptions are authorized by 
a state, such variances and exemptions must be permitted under conditions no less 
stringent than federal procedures. See 42 U.S.C. §300g-4 (Supp. IV 1974); 40 C.F.R. 
§§f42.40-142.46 (1976) (variances); 42 U.S.C. §300g-5 (Supp. IV 1974); 40 C.F.R. 
§§142.50-142.55 (1976) (exemptions). 
Preventing the Polluting and Securing the Sanitary Protection of Certain Waters Used 
As Sources of Public Water Supply, approved and adopted by the Department of Public 
Health on October 11, 1960, and filed with the Secretary of State of the Common-
wealth on June I, 1961. 
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plement, interpret, and enforce the Commonwealth's authority to deal 
with public drinking water systems.6 I 
Regarding the Commonwealth's present statutory framework, the 
Department of the Attorney General has suggested several areas 
where legislative amendments would strengthen its ability to qualify 
for assumption of primary enforcement responsibil~ty. Among other 
changes, it was suggested that the Department ~f Environmental 
Quality ("DEQE") obtain an amendment to section 17 of chapter III 
of the General Laws so that DEQE would have the <;luthority to assess 
daily or multiple penalties for violations of its rule~ I and regulations. 7 
Although it appears that with minor amendments tiie Commonwealth 
would have the legal authority required by the federal Act, it is evi-
dent that a complete overhaul of the present statutofY structure is ad-
visable to eliminate the lack of overall cohesion. Thle Commonwealth 
should consider comprehensive legislation in the form of the model 
for a state drinking water act prepared by the Committee on 
Suggested Legislation of the Council of State Governments.s 
i 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW 
§ 16.10. MEPA: Environmental Impact R~view. In 1972, 
through the enactment of the Massachusetts EnviroQmental Policy Act 
("MEPA"), the Legislature created for the Commonwealth an en-
vironmental impact review process somewhat akin t~that required in 
other states and by the federal government.! ME A requires, first, 
that state agencies and authorities consider the envir nmental impacts 
of their programs,2 and second, that they evidence this consideration 
by preparing a document, termed an environmenfal impact report 
("EIR"), before proceeding with any activity that m,ght cause signifi-
cant damage to the environment.3 The two requirements did not be-
I 
6 The Commonwealth's power to deal with public drinking wattr systems is currently 
found in the following statutes: C.L. c. 40, §§15B, 38, 39B, 39C, 40, 41 & 41A; C.L. c. 
Ill, §§2C, 5C, 17, 143, 159, 160A, 160B, 162 & 165; C.L. c. 114, §§35 & 36; C.L. c. 
140, §§32B & 32H; and C.L. c. 165, §§4B & 6. 
7 See note 4, d. (11) supra. . I 
8 COUNCIL OF STATE COVERNMENTS. 1974 SUGGESTED STATE L~GISLATION, 49, "Safe 
Drinking Water Act," (1974). 
§16.1O. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 781, §§2, 3, adding C.L. c. 30, §§~1' 62. For other dis-
cussions of this enactment and its counterparts, see generally 'Brien & Thompson, 
Environmental Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 18.2-18.6, at 47 -88, and particularly, 
id. at § 18.2, nA, at 478. 
2 C.L. c. 30, § 61. 
3/d. § 62, as amended through Acts of 1974, c. 257, §§ I, 2. A~ a result of the 1974 
amendment to MEPA, a different scope of environmental impactl review is required in 
such reports, depending upon whether the project is a state project or a private project. 
Acts of 1974, c. 257, § I, amending C.L. c. 30, § 62; O'Brien & Miller, Environmental 
Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 18.3, at 437-42. 
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come effective simultaneously. The first became effective on De-
cember 31, 1972 and the second on July 1, 1973.4 
Prior to the 1976 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court had had 
only two occasions to consider the MEPA in actions brought before it. 
In City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority5 (Mass port I), the Court 
ruled that MEPA's EIR requirements were not applicable to a given 
state agency project because the project had "commenced" prior to 
July 1, 1973, when the EIR requirement became operative.6 In Secre-
tary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Authority7 (Mass port II), 
the Court found that the EIR requirements were applicable to 
another project because the project had not "commenced" until after 
July 1, 1973.8 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in 
two cases, again had occasion to consider whether state agency proj-
ects had "commenced" prior to the date when MEPA's EIR re-
quirements became fully effective. 
The first decision dealing with the issue of commencement was Mar-
low v. City of New Bedford,9 rendered by the Court on January 9, 1976. 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 781, § 3. 
5364 Mass. 639, 308 N.E.2d 488, 6 E.R.C. 1337, 4 E.L.R. 20314 (1974), discussed in 
O'Brien & Miller, Environmental Law, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 18.5, at 450-53. 
6364 Mass. at 660-61, 308 N.E.2d at 502, 6 E.R.C. at 1346, 4 E.L.R. at 20320. In 
Massport I, the Massachusetts Port Authority ("Massport") became committed in April 
1973 to construct a new South Passenger Terminal and ancillary facilities at Logan Air-
port.ld. at 643-44, 308 N.E.2d at 492-93, 6 E.R.C. at 1339, 4 E.L.R. at 20315-16. The 
Supreme Judicial Court ruled that Massport was bound to comply with G.L. c. 31, § 61, 
which had an effective date of December 1972, but that it was not bound by G.L. c. 31, 
§ 62. 364 Mass. at 660, 308 N.E.2d at 502, 6 E.R.C. at 1346, 4 E.L.R. at 20320. For a 
detailed discussion and analysis of Massport I, see O'Brien & Miller, Environmental Law, 
1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 18.5, at 450-53. 
71975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 285, 323 N.E.2d 329, 7 KR.C. 1759,5 E.L.R. 20200, discussed 
in O'Brien & Thompson, Environmental Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 18.5, at 
482-88. 
81975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 297-98, 323 N.E.2d at 335, 7 E.R.C. at 1762, 5 E.L.R. at 
20201-02. In Massport II, the Massachusetts Port Authority ("Massport") undertook a 
project to extend the two runways and to construct a third at Logan Airport. /d. at 
285-86, 323 N.E.2d at 331, 7 E.R.C. at 1759, 5 E.L.R. at 20200. Between 1959 and 
1972, Massport had prepared generally for the expansion of the airport by acquiring 
title to land, receiving federal approval of the airport development plan, and contract-
ing for basic site preparation. Id. at 287-91,343 N.E.2d at 331-33,7 E.R.C. at 1760, 5 
E.L.R. at 20200-01. In January 1973, Massport gave notice of a public hearing on the 
runways project. Id. at 291,323 N.E.2d at 333,7 E.R.C. at 1760-61,5 E.L.R. at 20201. 
It was not until May 1974, however, that Massport entered into a binding contract for 
the runways work. /d. at 292, 323 N.E.2d at 333, 7 E.R.C. at 1761, 5 E.L.R. at 20201. 
Faced with the question whether G.L. c. 30, § 62, was applicable to a project with such a 
history, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the runways project had not commenced 
prior to the effective date for the EIR requirements. Id. at 304, 323 N.E.2d at 337, 7 
E.R.C. at 1764, 5 E.L.R. at 20202-03. For a detailed discussion and analysis of Massport 
II, see O'Brien & Thompson, Environmental Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 18.5, at 
482-88. 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 127,340 N.E.2d 494, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R.-. 
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The City of New Bedford and its redeVelopm$! t authority were 
charged with failure to comply with the environm ntal impact report 
requirements of MEP A before undertaking wor on a combined 
highway/sewer project in that city.lO On appeal, t e Court held that 
such compliance was unnecessary since the proje t had commenced 
prior to July 1, 1973, the date upon which MEBA's environmental 
impact report requirements became fully effective. 1 
The site of the controversial project was Coun y Street, a major 
thoroughfare in an area "of historical significance" 'n the City of New 
Bedford. The project was directed towards two objectives, traffic 
safety improvements and sewer rehabilitation. 12 T e traffic safety im-
provements were to consist principally of the straig tening and widen-
ing of Country Street, but necessitated the remo al of many shade 
trees thought by some to be aesthetic assets. 13 The ewer rehabilitation 
aspect of the project entailed the emplacement of a drainage system to 
permit the separation of storm water flows from sewage flows, and 
was a necessary precondition for federal assistance 'n the financing of 
a municipal sewage treatment plant. The dominant motivation for the 
city'S undertaking of the project was its desire to e eligible for this 
federal funding. 14 To assist it in financing the proj ct, the city sought 
a grant from the Massachusetts Department of Pub ic Works ("DPW"). 
By June 18, 1973, the city had secured such a gra t commitment and 
had contracted for and received completed engine ring plans for the 
projectY Subsequent to July 1, 1973, the city rece'ved final plan ap-
proval from the DPW, undertook public biddi g procedures, and 
executed a contract for construction of the proje t. Actual construc-
tion commenced on March 5, 1974.16 On the sam day, the plaintiffs 
initiated the litigation, seeking to enjoin the city fro~ continuing work 
on the project. 17 ! 
After trial in the superior court, an order was fntered adverse to 
the plaintiffs.1s The trial judge stated as his basis, for the order two 
alternate grounds: first, that the environmental imjact of the Country 
Road project was "insignificant," and second, that the city had com-
menced the project prior to July 1, 1973. 19 The tr al judge based his 
first finding, that the impact of the project was i significant, on the 
premise that, because the dominant motivation for the project was to 
10 [d. at 127-30,340 N.E.2d at 494-95, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. 
11 [d. at 139, 340 N.E.2d at 498, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
12 !d. at 128-30, 340 N.E.2d at 495, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
13 [d., 340 N.E.2d at 495, - E.R.C. '-, - E.L.R. -. f 
14 [d. at 130, 340 N.E.2d at 495, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
15 [d. at 130-31 n.5, 340 N.E.2d at 495-96 n.5, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R.-. 
16 [d. at 131 n.5, 340 N.E.2d at 496 n.5, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R -. 
17 Bill of Complaint of plaintiffs filed in Superior Court Brist I County, (filed March 
5, 1974). 
18 [d. at 128, 340 N.E.2d at 495, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
19 [d. at 135, 340 N.E.2d at 497, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
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secure eligibility for federal sewage treatment facility grants, the ben-
efits in improved water quality to be gained from the operation of 
the facility outweighed any adverse impacts to be suffered in the 
Country Road area. The judge's second finding, that the project had 
commenced before MEPA's EIR requirements became effective, was 
based on his conclusion that, as of that date, the project was complete 
to the point where it was ready to be subjected to public bidding pro-
cedures. The plaintiffs appealed from the superior court judgment. 
As to the first ground expressed by the judge, they argued that by 
making the judiciary rather than the appropriate administrative 
agency the forum for the balancing of environmental impacts and 
benefits, the intent of MEPA was "subverted."20 The plaintiffs also 
disputed the judge's finding that the project had commenced before 
July 1,1973. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court 
judgment. The Court's decision concerned only the second ground 
for the judgment, the point of commencement of the project. 21 The 
Court repeated its statement that the basic test to be used in determin-
ing the point of commencement "is the existence of a commitment ... 
which is irreversible in nature, and which has a clearly defined objec-
tive."22 Using this test in Marlow, the Court found that the circum-
stances of the city's scheme to improve Country Road, to rehabilitate 
the sewers underneath, and to build its sewage treatment plant en-
tailed a "matrix of commitments among [the city], the Commonwealth, 
and the Federal government in which the commitments to act and 
fund were interdependent."23 The Court expressly rejected plaintiffs' 
contention that the point of commencement would be determined by 
reference to a commitment between a public agency and a construc-
tion contractor for actual construction work on a project.24 In reaching 
its result in Marlow, the Court distinguished Marlow from Massport II. 
In the latter case, the Court found no such commitment because as of 
July 1, 1973, the defendant state agency had only received pre-
liminary engineering plans and had not made its "decision" to pro-
ceed or not proceed with the project. The Court noted that in Marlow 
the project had reached a more refined stage of development insofar 
as by the critical date, final plans had been completed and the deci-
sion to undertake the project had been made. 25 
The second case dealing with the issue of commencement was 
20 Id., 340 N.E.2d at 497, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
21 Id., 340 N.E.2d at 497, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
22Id. at 138, 340 N.E.2d at 498, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -, citing Massport II, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 298, 323 N.E.2d at 335,7 E.R.C. at 1762,5 E.L.R. at 20202. See note 
8 supra. 
23 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 138-39, 340 N.E.2d at 498, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R.-. 
24Id. at 139,340 N.E.2d at 498, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
25/d. at 140-41,340 N.E.2d at 499, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
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Springfield Y Trust v. Executive Director of the Massachusetts Housing Fi-
nance Agency,21l rendered by the Court on February 11, 1976. In that 
action, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency ("MHF A") was as-
sailed for an asserted failure to comply with MEPA's EIR re-
quirements incident to its award of a subsidy fqr the construction 
of a commerciallmixed-income-residential deVelOp~ent (the "develop-
ment") in the City of SpringfieldP On appeal,28 th Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the development had commence prior to the date 
when MEPA became fully effective.29 ! 
Prior to July 1, 1973, the MHF A issued and modified, and the de-
veloper accepted, a letter of commitment for a construction loan for 
the development. Also prior to July 1, 1973, the developer had exe-
cuted a contract for the construction of the development. 3o However, 
several notable events took place after that date. Between July 1, 1973 
and July 31, ]973, the developer executed a contract for engineering 
services for the project, all final documents perta~. ing to the MHFA 
financing were completed and recorded, and the HF A made its ini-
tial advancement of funds to the developer.31 pproximately six 
months later, the plaintiffs commenced the actio in superior court 
seeking to enjoin the advancement of further fun s for the develop-
ment. The action was dismissed by the trial court! and the plaintiffs 
appealed.32 
Upon review, the Supreme Judicial Court found it unnecessary to 
engage in a restatement of its previous holdings regarding com-
mencement. Instead, the Court summarized this precedent as reflect-
ing "a common-sense appreciation of when the stage of tentative 
planning passes to the stage of an engagement to act. "33 The Court 
noted further that commencement is a "functional concept" to be de-
I 
26 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 435,341 N.E.2d 893, - E.R.C. -, - ~.L.R.-. 
27 [d. at 435-37,341 N.E.2d at 894, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
28 The suit took a circuitous route to the Supreme Judicial Court. It commenced 
when Charles Gould, as trustee of a real estate trust, petitioned III February, 1974 for a 
mandamus to compel the director of MHF A to meet the EIR requirements of G.L. c. 
30, § 62, regarding the Springfield housing project. Gould sought a temporary restrain-
ing order enjoining further funding for the project. A superior court judge denied the 
application and Gould did not appeal that decision. Later Gould filed an "amended pe-
tition for writ of mandamus" bringing in other parties as defendants. The director of 
MHFA and the other parties moved for and were granted a judgment dismissing the 
claim for failure to state a claim. Gould appealed this dismiss~to the Appeals Court, 
whereupon the Supreme Judicial Court ordered the case transfe red to the latter court. 
On the appeal, the Springfield Y Trust was substituted as the successor in interest to 
the original real estate trust. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 435-37, 3 1 N.E.2d at 893-94, -
E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
29 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 441-42,341 N.E.2d at 896, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R.-. 
30 [d. at 437-38,341 N.E.2d at 894, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
31 [d. at 438,341 N.E.2d at 894, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
32 See note 28 supra. 
331976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 440-41,341 N.E.2d at 895, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R.-. 
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termined with respect to a given state agency in terms of the statutory 
mandate of that agency and its role in the overall context of a given 
project.34 Applying this approach to the facts in Springfield Y Trust, the 
Court found that MHF A's role was that of a "lender" whose "lending 
activity" was commenced by the tendering of a letter of commitment, 
which established between the MHF A and the developer "a solid 
commercial engagement ... not dissimilar to other loan commit-
ments."35 The Court thus concluded that, as to the MHF A, the de-
velopment had commenced prior to July 1,1973. 
The Marlow and the Springfield Y Trust cases illustrate the Court's 
apparent resolve not to be held to rigid tests in determining the point 
of commencement. In both opinions the Court found that the point 
of commencement had occurred, not at the execution of construction 
contracts, but at the earlier point at which the agency had formed its 
decision to undertake the project. Admittedly, the attempt to identify 
a point of decisionmaking necessitates an inquiry which can entail an 
evaluation of subjective considerations. However, as can be seen from 
Marlow, it is possible to overcome any frailties in basing a decision on 
such subjective considerations by a careful examination into the cir-
cumstances underlying an agency's decision to embark upon a given 
project. 
34Id. at 441,341 N.E.2d at 896, - E.R.c. -, - E.L.R. -. 
35Id. at 441-42,341 N.E.2d at 896, - E.R.C. -, - E.L.R. -. 
37
O'Brien and Thompson: Chapter 16: Environmental Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
38
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1976 [1976], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1976/iss1/20
